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Default logics are usually used to describe the regular behavior and normal properties of
domain elements. In this paper we suggest, conversely, that the framework of default logics
can be exploited for detecting outliers. Outliers are observations expressed by sets of literals
that feature unexpected semantical characteristics. These sets of literals are selected among
those explicitly embodied in the given knowledge base. Hence, essentially we perceive
outlier detection as a knowledge discovery technique. This paper deﬁnes the notion of
outlier in two related formalisms for specifying defaults: Reiter’s default logic and extended
disjunctive logic programs. For each of the two formalisms, we show that ﬁnding outliers is
quite complex. Indeed, we prove that several versions of the outlier detection problem lie
over the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. We believe that a thorough complexity
analysis, as done here, is a useful preliminary step towards developing effective heuristics
and exploring tractable subsets of outlier detection problems.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
This paper is about detecting outliers. In this work, outliers are unexpected observations, e.g., strange characteristics of
individuals, in a given application domain. Exceptionality is determined here with respect to a given trustable knowledge
base, with which a given set of elements does not comply. The issue that we address is how to locate such unusual elements
automatically.
A ﬁrst step towards automatically detecting outliers is to state their formal deﬁnition. In this work, it is assumed that the
given knowledge base is expressed using a default reasoning language and hence we formalize our deﬁnition of outliers in
this framework. The languages mainly dealt with are propositional default logics and extended disjunctive logic programs.
Default logic was originally developed as a tool for working with incomplete knowledge. Default rules allow one to
describe a normal behavior of a system and to draw consequent conclusions. As such, default rules can also be exploited for
detecting outliers—observations that are unexpected according to the default theory at hand. This is the basic idea behind
this paper. We refer to outliers as sets of observations that demonstrate some properties contrasting with those that can
be logically “justiﬁed” according to the given knowledge base. Along with outliers, their “witnesses” are singled out—those
unexpected properties that characterize outliers.
To illustrate, some informal application examples for outlier detection are described below.
✩ This manuscript is an extended and comprehensive report of results of which part have appeared in IJCAI-03 under the title “Outlier Detection Using
Default Logic” and in ECAI-04 under the title “Outlier Detection Using Disjunctive Logic Programming”.
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byte ﬁle from a server, but one day the system becomes slower, instead, eight seconds are needed to perform the
same task. While eight seconds may indicate a good performance, it is, nonetheless, helpful to ﬁnd the source of
the delay in order to prevent more critical faults in the future. In this case, the download operation is the outlier
while the delay is its witness.
Mechanical failure. Assume that someone’s car brakes are making a strange noise. Although they seem to be functioning
properly, this is not a normal behavior and the car is brought in for servicing. In this case, the car brakes are the
outlier and the noise is a witness for it.
Knowledge base integrity. If an abnormal property is discovered in a database, the source that reported this information
would have to be checked. Detecting abnormal properties, that is, detecting outliers, can also lead to an update of
default rules in a knowledge base. For example, suppose we have the rule that birds ﬂy, and we observe a bird that
does not ﬂy. This occurrence of such an outlier in the theory would be reported to the knowledge engineer. The
engineer investigates the case, ﬁnds out that the bird is actually a penguin, therefore he updates the knowledge
base with the default “penguins do not ﬂy.”
According to our approach, exceptions are not explicitly recorded in the knowledge base as “abnormals,” as is often done
in logical-based abduction [16,23,47]. Rather, their “abnormality" is singled out precisely because some of the properties
characterizing them cannot be justiﬁed within the given theory.
In this paper we formally deﬁne outliers in both the related formalisms of Reiter’s default logic and Extended disjunctive
logic programming (EDLP).
Reiter’s Default Logic is a powerful nonmonotonic formalism to deal with incomplete information, while logic program-
ming is a practical tool that is widely employed in KR&R. The paper mostly deals with the propositional fragment of these
logics. However, ﬁrst-order default theories shall be also brieﬂy discussed in the paper (see Section 5 below).
In the logic programming framework, we focus on Answer Set Semantics, which is used in most advanced systems for
knowledge representation [38,40,43]. Extended logic programs (ELP) under Answer Set Semantics allow both negation as fail-
ure and classical negation to be used. These programs can be naturally embedded into default theories and therefore can
be considered as a subset of default logic. As a consequence, our results for default theories carry over quite simply to ELPs.
However, unlike ELP, extended disjunctive logic programs (EDLP) under Answer Set Semantics, in which also head-disjunction
is allowed, cannot be viewed as a subset of default logic, although default logic in its full volume does include disjunction.
Indeed, part of the motivation for developing disjunctive logic programming lies in the limitations of default logic in han-
dling disjunctive knowledge (see the paper by Poole [47]). In this context, EDLP can be considered as a convenient tool for
representing and manipulating complex knowledge [38] due to its declarativity and expressive power.
In what follows, we ﬁrst introduce our formal deﬁnition of outliers. Then, we analyze the complexities involved in
incorporating the outlier detection mechanism into knowledge bases expressed in default logic and extended disjunctive
logic programs. We believe that a thorough complexity analysis is a useful step towards singling out the more complex
subtasks involved in outlier detection. This ﬁrst step is conducive to designing effective algorithms for implementation
purposes.
According to the view adopted in this work, the witness that an observation is an outlier is a property or a behavior
that is explicitly the opposite of what is expected. Representing such contradicting properties requires the usage of classical
negation. Both default logic and extended logic programs make use of classical negation. Hence, these two languages repre-
sent a natural setting for outlier detection. A different approach, which does not require that the negation of the exceptional
property is explicitly inferred but, rather, that it is simply not entailed by a logic program, is taken in [5]. As explained
thoroughly in this paper, the anomalies that can be singled out by the deﬁnition of [5] are quite different than the outliers
detected by the work presented here. This is mirrored in the different complexity ﬁgures we obtained: most of the outlier
detection problems investigated here lie at the third level of the polynomial hierarchy, whereas the most complex of the
problems considered in [5] are contained in its second level. In the sequel we will further elaborate on these differences.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides preliminary deﬁnitions and Section 3 deﬁnes outliers
and related notions. Section 4 discusses the complexity of ﬁnding outliers in general propositional as well as in disjunction-
free default logics. Section 5 deals with ﬁrst-order defaults. Section 6 discusses related work—in particular, the relationship
between outlier detection and abduction. Finally, Section 7 draws conclusions.
2. Preliminary deﬁnitions
In this section we brieﬂy review preliminary deﬁnitions used in default logic and extended (disjunctive) logic programs.
Note that only the propositional fragment of these logics is considered here. Outlier detection in ﬁrst-order default languages
shall be brieﬂy discussed in Section 5. Thus, whenever a default theory or a logic program with variables is used, it is
referred to as an abbreviation of its grounded version.
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Default logic was ﬁrst introduced by Reiter in a ﬁrst-order setting [49]. Next we recall basic deﬁnitions concerning the
propositional fragment of default logic. Let T be a propositional theory and S a set of propositional formulas. Then, we
denote by T ∗ the logical closure of T and by ¬S the set {¬(s) | s ∈ S}. A set of literals L is inconsistent if, for some literal
 ∈ L, ¬ ∈ L.
A propositional default theory  is a pair (D,W ) consisting of a set W of propositional formulas and a set D of default
rules. In this paper we deal with ﬁnite default theories. A default theory  = (D,W ) is ﬁnite if both the set of default rules
D and the set of propositional formulas W are ﬁnite. A default rule δ has the form
α : β1, . . . , βm
γ
(1)
where α, each βi , 1  i  m, and γ are propositional formulas. In particular, α is called the prerequisite, β1, . . . , βm are
called the justiﬁcations, and γ is called the consequent (or conclusion) of δ. The prerequisite may be missing but the jus-
tiﬁcation and the consequent are required (an empty justiﬁcation is tantamount to having the identically true literal true
(Ray Reiter, Personal communication, 1992) speciﬁed in its place). If the conclusion of a default rule is included in its justi-
ﬁcation, the rule is called semi-normal [25], while if the conclusion is identical to the justiﬁcation the rule is called normal.
A default theory containing only (semi-)normal defaults is called (semi-)normal. Given a default rule δ, pre(δ), just(δ), and
concl(δ) denote the prerequisite, justiﬁcation, and consequent of δ, respectively. Analogously, given a set of default rules
D = {δ1, . . . , δn}, pre(D), just(D), and concl(D) denote, respectively, the sets {pre(δ1), . . . ,pre(δn)}, {just(δ1), . . . , just(δn)}, and
{concl(δ1), . . . , concl(δn)}.
A propositional default theory  = (D,W ) is disjunction free (DF for short) [33], if W is a set of literals, and pre(δ),
just(δ), and concl(δ) are conjunctions of literals.
The informal meaning of a default rule δ can be stated as follows: If pre(δ) is known to hold and if it is consistent
to assume just(δ), then infer concl(δ). The formal semantics of a default theory  is deﬁned in terms of extensions, which
denote maximal sets of conclusions that can be drawn from . Thus, E is an extension for a theory  = (D,W ) if it satisﬁes
the following set of equations:
– E0 = W ,
– for i  0, Ei+1 = E∗i ∪ {γ | α:β1,...,βmγ ∈ D,α ∈ Ei,¬β1 /∈ E, . . . ,¬βm /∈ E},
– E =⋃∞i=0 Ei .
An extension E of a ﬁnite propositional default theory  = (D,W ) can be ﬁnitely characterized through the set DE of the
generating defaults for E w.r.t.  [49,58]. In fact, [58] shows that a ﬁnite propositional default theory  = (D,W ) has an
extension E iff there exists a set DE ⊆ D , the generating defaults for E w.r.t. , that can be partitioned into a ﬁnite number
of strata D(0)E , D
(1)
E , . . . , D
(n)
E , such that:
– D(0)E = {δ | δ ∈ DE ,pre(δ) ∈ W ∗},
– for each i, 1 i  n, D(i)E = {δ | δ ∈ DE −
⋃i−1
j=0 D
( j)
E ,pre(δ) ∈ (W ∪ concl(
⋃i−1
j=0 D
( j)
E ))
∗},
– (∀δ ∈ DE )(∀β ∈ just(δ))(¬β /∈ (W ∪ concl(DE ))∗), and
– (∀δ ∈ D)(pre(δ) ∈ (W ∪ concl(DE ))∗ ∧ (∀β ∈ just(δ))(¬β /∈ (W ∪ concl(DE ))∗ ⇒ δ ∈ DE ).
If such a set DE exists, then E = (W ∪ concl(DE ))∗ is an extension of .
For the case of DF theories, it is useful to rewrite the deﬁnition of extension, as done in [33]. Let  = (D,W ) be a DF
default theory. Then E is an extension of  if there exists a sequence of defaults δ1, . . . , δn from D and a sequence of sets
E0, E1, . . . , En , such that for all i > 0:
– E0 = W ,
– Ei = Ei−1 ∪ concl(δi),
– pre(δi) ⊆ Ei−1,
– (
 ∃c ∈ just(δi))(¬c ∈ En),
– (
 ∃δ ∈ D)(pre(δ) ⊆ En ∧ concl(δ) 
⊆ En ∧ (
 ∃c ∈ just(δ))(¬c ∈ En)),
– E is the logical closure of En
where En is called the signature set of E and is denoted lits(E) and the sequence of rules δ1, . . . , δn is the set DE of
generating defaults of E .
Although default theories are nonmonotonic, normal default theories satisfy the property of semi-monotonicity (see The-
orem 3.2 of [49]). That is: Let  = (D,W ) and ′ = (D ′,W ) be two default theories such that D ⊆ D ′; then for each
extension E of  there is an extension E ′ of ′ such that E ⊆ E ′ .
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it has at least one extension, and incoherent otherwise. Normal default theories are coherent. A coherent default theory
 = (D,W ) is called inconsistent if it has just one extension which is inconsistent. By Theorem 2.2 of [49], the theory  is
inconsistent iff W is inconsistent.
The entailment problem is one of the basic problems in KR formalisms. For default theories, it is as follows: Given a
default theory  and a propositional formula φ, does every extension of  contain φ? In the aﬃrmative case, we write
 | φ. For a set of propositional formulas S , we analogously write  | S to denote (∀φ ∈ S) ( | φ). The entailment
realizes the form of reasoning called skeptical (or cautious) reasoning [18].
2.2. Extended disjunctive logic programs
A literal is an expression of the form  or ¬ where  is a propositional letter and the symbol “¬” denotes classical
negation. A propositional EDLP is a collection of rules of the form
L1| . . . |Lk ← Lk+1, . . . , Lm,not Lm+1, . . . ,not Ln
where n,m,k 0, the symbol “not ” denotes negation by default and each Li is a literal. If k = 0, then the rule is called an
integrity clause. If 0 k 1 then the rule is said to be non-disjunctive. A propositional ELP is a collection of non-disjunctive
rules.
An EDLP is given semantics using answer sets [26], which are deﬁned as follows: Let Lit(P ) denote the set of literals
obtained using the propositional letters occurring in P . By a context [12] we mean any subset of Lit(P ). Let P be a negation-
by-default-free EDLP. A context is S closed under P if, for each rule L1| . . . |Lk ← Lk+1, . . . , Lm in P , if Lk+1, . . . , Lm ∈ S then,
for some i = 1, . . . ,k, Li ∈ S . An answer set of P is any minimal context S such that (1) S is closed under P and (2) if S is
inconsistent, then S = Lit(P ).
For general EDLPs answer sets are deﬁned as follows: Let the reduct of P w.r.t. the context S , denoted by Red(P , S), be the
EDLP obtained from P by deleting (i) each rule that has not L in its body, for some L ∈ S , and (ii) all remaining subformulas
of the form not L from rule bodies. Then, any context S which is an answer set of Red(P , S) is an answer set of P .
The collection of all consistent answer sets of an EDLP P is denoted ANSW(P ). An EDLP P is ANSW-consistent iff
ANSW(P ) 
= ∅. An EDLP P entails a propositional formula F , written P | F , if F ∈ S∗ for each S ∈ ANSW(P ). P | G ,
for a set of propositional formulas G , means that (∀F ∈ G)(P | F ).
2.3. Complexity theory
Some basic deﬁnitions in complexity theory are recalled next, particularly that of the polynomial time hierarchy. The
reader is referred to [31,45] for more details.
Decision problems are mappings from strings (encoding the input instance over a suitable alphabet) to {“yes”, “no”}. The
language associated with a decision problem is the set of all and only the strings over the alphabet such that the decision
problem outputs “yes” on them. A (possibly nondeterministic) Turing machine M answers a decision problem if on a given
input x, (i) a branch of M halts in an accepting state iff x is a “yes” instance, and (ii) all the branches of M halt in some
rejecting state iff x is a “no” instance.
The class P is the set of decision problems that can be answered by a deterministic Turing machine in polynomial time.
The class of decision problems that can be solved by a nondeterministic Turing machine in polynomial time is denoted by
NP, while the class of decision problems whose complementary problem is in NP, is denoted by co-NP.
More generally, classes 	Pk and 

P
k, which form the polynomial hierarchy, are deﬁned as follows: 	
P
0 = 
P0 = P and for all
k 1, 	Pk = NP	
P
k−1 , and 
Pk = co-	Pk . 	Pk is modeled computability by a nondeterministic polynomial time Turing machine
which may use an oracle for solving a problem in 	Pk−1. An oracle is, loosely speaking, a subprogram that can be run with a
constant computational cost. Thus, NP = 	P1 , and co-NP = 
P1. The class DPk, k 1, is the class of problems that are deﬁned
as the conjunction of two independent problems, one from 	Pk and one from 

P
k. That is, a problem associated with a
language L is in DPk if and only if there are two languages L1, associated with a problem in 	
P
k , and L2, associated with a
problem in 
P2, such that L = L1 ∩ L2. Note that, for all k 1, 	Pk ⊆ DPk ⊆ 	Pk+1.
Finally, we need to recall the notion of reduction. A decision problem A1 is polynomially reducible to a decision prob-
lem A2 if there is a polynomial time computable function h such that for every x, h(x) is deﬁned and A1 output “yes” on
input x iff A2 outputs “yes” on input h(x). A decision problem A is complete for the class C of the polynomial hierarchy iff
A belongs to C and every problem in C is polynomially reducible to A.
A well-known 	Pk -complete problem is to decide the satisﬁability of a formula QBEk,∃ , that is, a formula of the form∃X1∀X2 . . . Q Xk f (X1, . . . , Xk), where Q is ∃ if k is odd and ∀ if k is even, X1, . . . , Xk are disjoint sets of variables, and
f (X1, . . . , Xk) is a propositional formula in conjunctive normal form if k is odd and in disjunctive normal form if k is even,
on the set of variables X1, . . . , Xk . Analogously, deciding the validity of a formula QBEk,∀ , that is a formula of the form
∀X1∃X2 . . . Q Xk f (X1, . . . , Xk), where Q is ∀ if k is odd and is ∃ if k is even, and f (X1, . . . , Xk) is a propositional formula
in disjunctive normal form if k is odd and in conjunctive normal form if k is even, on the set of variables X1, . . . , Xn ,
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Pk. Finally, deciding the conjunction  ∧  , where  is a QBEk,∃ formula and  is a QBEk,∀ formula, is
complete for DPk.
3. Outliers
Next, we shall formally deﬁne the notion of outlier in the context of default logic and extended disjunctive logic pro-
gramming. Also, we shall introduce a number of signiﬁcant decision problems (which we shall call queries) associated with
singling outliers out.
3.1. Outliers in default logic
We start by deﬁning the concept of outlier in default logic. To motivate the deﬁnition and clarify it, we present several
examples.
Example 3.1. Consider the following default theory which represents the knowledge that birds normally ﬂy, but penguins
normally do not ﬂy. Moreover, we know that penguins are birds. Also, we have observed that Tweety is a bird, Pini is a
penguin, and Tweety does not ﬂy.
D =
{
Bird(x) : Fly(x)
Fly(x)
,
Penguin(x) : ¬Fly(x)
¬Fly(x)
}
,
W = {Bird(Tweety),Penguin(Pini),¬Fly(Tweety)}∪ {Penguin(X) → Bird(X)}.
This default theory has two extensions. One extension is the logical closure of W ∪ {Bird(Pini),¬Fly(Pini)} and the other is
the logical closure of W ∪ {Bird(Pini), Fly(Pini)}. As ¬Fly(Tweety) ∈ W , both extensions include this literal. But Tweety’s not
ﬂying is quite strange. Indeed, it is known that birds normally ﬂy, Tweety is a bird and there is no apparent justiﬁcation for
the fact that Tweety does not ﬂy (other than ¬Fly(Tweety) belonging to W ). Were Tweety a penguin, Tweety’s not ﬂying
would be promptly explained. But, as the theory stands, Tweety’s not ﬂying is inexplicable. Moreover, if we try to nail down
what makes all that exceptional, we may notice that if we had dropped the observation ¬Fly(Tweety) from W , the exact
opposite would have been concluded, namely, that Tweety does ﬂy. But if both ¬Fly(Tweety) and Bird(Tweety) are dropped
from W , it can be no longer concluded that Tweety ﬂies. Hence, Fly(Tweety) can be looked at as a “consequence” of the fact
that Tweety is a bird. Thus Bird(Tweety) is the observation to be considered exceptional and ¬Fly(Tweety) determines this
exceptionality. A set of literals like {Bird(Tweety)} will be called an outlier, whereas a set of literals like {¬Fly(Tweety)} will
be called its witness set in the following.
In sum, we can deﬁne an outlier as an observation characterized by some exceptional semantical property. In the logic,
this observation will be denoted by a set of literals. Such sets of literals are going to denote anomalous characteristics of
elements of the world that our knowledge base encodes (e.g., a bird named Tweety in the example above). Therefore, in what
follows, though we may sometime talk informally about outliers as individuals, it should be clear that, formally, outliers are
observations as encoded by sets of literals.
We can now give a formal deﬁnition of outlier. We make use of the following notation: given a set W and a list of sets
S1, . . . , Sn , WS1,...,Sn denotes the set W \ (S1 ∪ S2 ∪ · · · ∪ Sn).
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Outliers and outlier witness set in default logic). L et  = (D,W ) be a propositional default theory and let L ⊆ W
be a set of literals.2 If there exists a nonempty set of literals S ⊆ WL such that:
(i) (D,WS ) | ¬S , and
(ii) (D,WS,L) 
| ¬S
then we say that L is an outlier set in  and S is an outlier witness set for L in . If there is no L′ ⊂ L and S ′ ⊆ WL′ such
that L′ is an outlier with witness set S ′ in , then we say that L is a minimal outlier set.
According to this deﬁnition, in the default theory of Example 3.1 we can conclude that {Bird(Tweety)} denotes an outlier
set and {¬Fly(Tweety)} is its witness.
Remark 3.3. (i) We point out that we regard outlier detection as a kind of data mining technique. Therefore, we mine from
explicitly observed facts and, accordingly, outliers (as well as witnesses) are deﬁned as sets of literals that are explicitly
included in the set of observations W .
2 Note that in a preliminary version of this work [4], an outlier was deﬁned as a single literal. In this work, we generalize that deﬁnition since, as we
will show in the sequel, in some scenarios the original deﬁnition might be too restrictive.
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should be mined from. This is certainly a sensible and interesting idea from an application viewpoint. However, if we
use a different deﬁnition of outliers according to this idea, it will make no difference in the conceptual and theoretical
development we are going to present in the following.
Next, we shall illustrate our deﬁnition by several further examples.
Example 3.4. A well-known center for rare diseases is located in the small city of Lamezia in Calabria. One hot day in
summer you are walking along the nice streets of Lamezia when you notice a young man wearing a heavy coat going in
the same direction. In this situation, if you are a student in a school of medicine interested in genetic diseases, you might
want to ask that man about his rare illness. Another way to put it is to say that the fact that the man is wearing a coat in
a hot summer day makes him an outlier, and one of the probable explanations at that time and place for such behavior is
that this man has a rare genetic disease. A default theory  that describes this episode might be as follows:
D =
{
Day(x)∧Warm(x)∧ Person(y) : ¬WearCoat(y, x)
¬WearCoat(y, x)
}
,
W = {Day(Tuesday),Warm(Tuesday),Person(Jim),WearCoat(Jim,Tuesday)}.
This theory claims that normally a person would not wear a coat on a warm day. The observations are that Tuesday is a
day and Tuesday is warm and Jim is a person who is wearing a coat on Tuesday. This system would preferably conclude
that Jim is the argument of an outlier. Indeed, the reader can verify that the following facts are true:
(i) (D,W {WearCoat(Jim,Tuesday)}) | ¬WearCoat(Jim,Tuesday)
1. (D,W {WearCoat(Jim,Tuesday)},{Person(Jim)}) 
| ¬WearCoat(Jim,Tuesday).
2. (D,W {WearCoat(Jim,Tuesday)},{Day(Tuesday)}) 
| ¬WearCoat(Jim,Tuesday).
3. (D,W {WearCoat(Jim,Tuesday)},{Warm(Tuesday)}) 
| ¬WearCoat(Jim,Tuesday).
Hence, {Person(Jim)}, {Day(Tuesday)} and {Warm(Tuesday)} are all the minimal outliers found in our theory and
{WearCoat(Jim,Tuesday)} is the unique outlier witness set for each of them.
Outlier witnesses have been deﬁned as sets because, in general, a single literal may not suﬃce to form a witness for a
given outlier. We illustrate this in the following example.
Example 3.5. Consider the default theory  = (D,W ), where the set of default rules D conveys the following information
about weather and traﬃc:
(i) SummerWeekend∧Traﬃc_Jam:Accident∨TornadoAccident∨Tornado —that is, normally, if there is a traﬃc jam during a summer weekend then an
accident has occurred or a tornado hit the freeway.
(ii) Accident:Police∧AmbulancePolice∧Ambulance —that is, normally, if an accident occurred then the police and ambulances are around.
(iii) Tornado:Police∧AmbulancePolice∧Ambulance —that is, normally, if a tornado hits the freeway then the police and ambulances are around.
Suppose also that W = {SummerWeekend,Traﬃc_Jam,¬Police,¬Ambulance}. Then, the set S = {Police,Ambulance} is an out-
lier witness for the outlier L = {SummerWeekend} (and for the outlier L′ = {Traﬃc_Jam} as well). Note that there is no
singleton witness for this outlier.
Example 3.6. Consider the following default theory :
D =
{
PlantOwner(x) :MakesMoney(x)
MakesMoney(x)
,
GoodWilling(x) :WantsReducedPollution(x)
WantsReducedPollution(x)
,
PlantOwner(x)∧ GoodWilling(x) : Donates(x)
Donates(x)
}
, and
W = {PlantOwner(Johnny),GoodWilling(Johnny),¬MakesMoney(Johnny),
Donates(Johnny),¬WantsReducedPollution(Johnny)}.
This theory claims that normally plant owners make money and that good-willed plant owners are interested in reduced
pollution and in donations. The observations are that Johnny is a good-willed plant owner who does not make money and is
not interested in reduced pollution, but anyway makes donations. Therefore it would be interesting to have a KR system that
could automatically conclude that Johnny is the argument of two outliers. Indeed, the reader can verify that the following
facts are true:
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(ii) (D,W {¬WantsReducedPollution(Johnny)}) |WantsReducedPollution(Johnny),
(iii) (D,W {¬MakesMoney(Johnny)},{PlantOwner(Johnny)}) 
|MakesMoney(Johnny), and
(iv) (D,W {¬WantsReducedPollution(Johnny)},{GoodWilling(Johnny)}) 
|WantsReducedPollution(Johnny).
Hence, both {¬MakesMoney(Johnny)} and {¬WantsReducedPollution(Johnny)} are outlier witnesses, while {PlantOwner(Johnny)}
and {GoodWilling(Johnny)} are the corresponding outliers.
Finally, the following example demonstrates why it is sensible to deﬁne an outlier as a set, and not as a single literal.
Example 3.7. Consider a set of default rules D conveying the following information about watering the grass:
(i) SprinklerOn:WetGrassWetGrass —normally, if the sprinkler is on, the grass is wet.
(ii) Rain:WetGrassWetGrass —normally, when it is raining the grass is wet.
(iii) SprinklerOn:¬WinterTime¬WinterTime —the sprinkler does not normally operate during the winter.
(iv) ¬WinterTime:¬ChimneySmoke¬ChimneySmoke —normally, there is no smoke in the chimney when it is not winter time (since the ﬁreplace is
not used).
Now, suppose outliers have to be deﬁned to be single literals. Then, for the observation W1 = {Rain,¬WetGrass} we
would have that {Rain} is an outlier with witness set {¬WetGrass}. Similarly, for the observations W2 = {SprinklerOn,
¬WetGrass}, we would have that {SprinklerOn} is an outlier with witness set {¬WetGrass}. However, for the observation
W3 = {SprinklerOn,Rain,¬WetGrass} no outliers can be singled out. This is because:
(i) (D,W {¬WetGrass}) |WetGrass, but
(ii) (D,W {¬WetGrass,Rain}) |WetGrass and also (D,W {¬WetGrass,SprinklerOn}) |WetGrass.
However, if both Rain and SprinklerOn are dropped from W , it is no longer possible to infer WetGrass and, as such,
{Rain,WetGrass} is an outlier according to our deﬁnition with witness set {¬WetGrass}.
For another example, suppose we have the set D as above, and W4 = {SprinklerOn,ChimneySmoke}. Then {SprinklerOn}
is an outlier, with the witness {ChimneySmoke}. If the observations are W5 = {¬WinterTime,ChimneySmoke}, then
{¬WinterTime} is an outlier, with the witness {ChimneySmoke}. However, for the observations W6 = {¬WinterTime,
SprinklerOn,ChimneySmoke} we will not get any outliers if outlier would have been deﬁned as a single literal while
{¬WinterTime, SprinklerOn} is an outlier according to our deﬁnition with outlier witness {ChimneySmoke}.
Thus, deﬁnition that restricts the outlier to be a single literal may be too restrictive. 
3.2. Outlier detection in extended disjunctive logic programs
We now deﬁne the concept of outlier in the context of EDLP. Within this reasoning framework, we assume that the
general knowledge about the world is encoded as an extended (disjunctive) logic program D , called the rule program, and
that the factual evidence about some aspects of the current status of the world is encoded in a set of literals W , called the
observations set.
Thus, a rule-observations program P is a pair P = (D,W ) consisting of a rules program and an observations set. Intuitively,
a rule-observations program relates the general knowledge encoded in D with the evidence about the world encoded in W .
In the following we denote by P = (D,W ) the EDLP D ∪ W . Also, given two disjoint subsets L and S of W , we denote
by P S the logic program D ∪ (W \ S) and by P S,L the logic program D ∪ (W \ (S ∪ L)). In the context of EDLP knowledge
bases, the deﬁnition of outlier is analogous to that given in the framework of default logic (Deﬁnition 3.2).
Deﬁnition 3.8 (Outliers and outlier witness set in extended logic programs). Let a rule-observations program P = (D,W ) and a
set of literals L ⊆ W be given. If there exists a nonempty set of literals S ⊆ WL such that:
(i) P S | ¬S , and
(ii) P S,L 
| ¬S
then we say that L is an outlier set and S is an outlier witness set for L in P .
All the motivating examples given in Section 3.1 for the default logic framework, except Example 3.5, can be translated
to EDLP. For instance, the default theory given in Example 3.1 can be translated to an EDLP as follows: Let P = (D,W ),
where W = {Bird(Tweety),¬Fly(Tweety)} ∪ {Bird(X) ← Penguin(X)} and D is the set
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Fly(X) ← Bird(X),not ¬Fly(X),
¬Fly(X) ← Penguin(X),not Fly(X)}.
Analogous to what we showed in Section 3.1, if we are trying to understand what makes Tweety an exception, we notice
that if we drop the observation ¬Fly(Tweety), we would conclude the exact opposite, namely, that Tweety does ﬂy. Thus,
{¬Fly(Tweety)} is a witness according to Deﬁnition 3.8. Furthermore, if we drop both the observations ¬Fly(Tweety) and
Bird(Tweety), we are no longer able to conclude that Tweety ﬂies. This implies that Fly(Tweety) is a consequence of the fact
that Tweety is a bird, and thus Bird(Tweety) is an outlier.
In the next example, we use disjunctive information represented in an EDLP which is not head-cycle-free [11]. We are
interested in a full-ﬂedged EDLP for two main reasons. First, as noted by [11], head-cycle-free EDLPs can be faithfully
translated into disjunction-free logic programs. Second, disjunction-free programs are equivalent to a subset of default logic
and their expressive power is strictly less than that of general disjunctive programs [18].
The following example is adapted from [15]. We assume a situation where goods from a set G are produced by companies
in a set C owned by a set of stock holders H . Each good is produced by at most two companies and each company may
produce several goods. Suppose that currently H produces all goods in G by means of its companies, and this represents
a business advantage over its competitors. Hence, the owners’ policy prescribes that for a company c ∈ C to be safely sold,
H should not loose its capability of producing all goods. Therefore, the owners consider not safely sellable any company
that belongs to all minimal sets of companies producing all goods. The situation is further complicated by the presence of
a control relationship amongst companies: a company c might be controlled by a triplet of companies c1, c2, c3. If this is
the case, then c is considered safely sellable only if at least one among its controlling companies c1, c2, c3 is safely sellable
as well. Call strategic a company that cannot be safely sold according to the owners’ policy. The owners need to know
which companies can be safely sold. The situation can be formalized in an EDLP as follows. There are literals of the form
prod(g, c1, c2), one for each good g , to denote that good g is produced by companies c1 and c2. We will use the literal
prod(g, c, c) to denote that good g is produced by only one company c. There are literals of the form contr(c, c1, c2, c3) to
denote that c is controlled by c1, c2, c3. Rules in P are as follows:
– a company is not strategic if it is consistent to assume so
¬strategic(X) ← not strategic(X)
– at least one of the companies producing a good is strategic
strategic(Y ) | strategic(Z) ← prod(X, Y , Z)
– a company controlled by three strategic companies is strategic as well
strategic(W ) ← contr(W , X, Y , Z), strategic(X), strategic(Y ), strategic(Z)
– normally strategic companies are not sellable
unsell(X) ← strategic(X),not ¬unsell(X).
We recall that to establish whether a company c is indeed strategic in the above setting is a 
P2-complete problem [15]
and, as such, cannot be expressed by means of any disjunction-free logic program (this is because disjunction-free logic
programs can express only problems that are at most as complex as co-NP). Now assume that the following literals have
been observed
W = {prod(g1, c1, c2),prod(g2, c1, c3),prod(g3, c2, c3),prod(g4, c2, c4),prod(g5, c3, c4),prod(g6, c1, c4),
prod(g7, c2, c5), contr(c5, c1, c2, c3), contr(c5, c1, c2, c4), contr(c5, c2, c3, c4),¬unsell(c5)
}
.
Then, it is evident that there is an outlier among the observations. Indeed, according to our formal deﬁnition, we have that
{¬unsell(c5)} is an outlier witness with outlier {contr(c5, c1, c2, c3)}.
3.3. Some more extensive examples
In this section we describe in detail some further and more extensive application examples of the proposed framework.
3.3.1. Learning and knowledge base integrity
Assume a database of examples is given—both positive and negative examples. We want to acquire knowledge that
abstracts the examples. A way to go is to learn rules encoding the knowledge. Clear enough, the more expressive the rule
language employed for the learning purposes is, the richer the description of the example database properties as learnt
in this process will be. In this context, techniques to induce defaults from examples can be applied, which guarantee the
capability of encoding defeasible 	P2 properties of the database (whereas, for instance, learning Horn rules would result
in the possibility of encoding “certain” polynomial time properties). For instance, the techniques of [20,42] can be applied
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occurring in the knowledge base.
Next we show an example of such application using the framework for learning default theories proposed in [20]. First,
we recall the deﬁnition of a learned default theory provided there.3
Deﬁnition 3.9 (Learning a default theory). [20] Given a set of positive examples E+ = {e1, e2, . . . , en} of the predicate p (that
is, p(e) is assumed to be true for all e ∈ E+), a set of negative examples E− = {e′1, e′2, . . . , e′m} (that is, ¬p(e) is assumed be
true for all e ∈ E−) and an initial consistent set of ﬁrst order formulas W containing no occurrence of p, learning a default
theory consists of ﬁnding a set D of defaults such that
(D,W ) |
( ∧
e∈E+
p(e)
)
∧
( ∧
e∈E−
¬p(e)
)
.
Informally speaking,4 default rules learnt by the method reported in [20] have the following form:
ϕ(X) : p(X)∧¬ψ(X)
p(X)
(
ϕ(X) : ¬p(X)∧¬ψ(X)
¬p(X) , resp.
)
where the formula ϕ(X) generalizes some positive (negative, resp.) examples, and the formula ψ(X) generalizes all the
exceptions to ϕ(X), that are the negative (positive, resp.) examples which are generalized by ϕ(X).
Consider the following set of ﬁrst-order formulas W :
pen(1), pen(2), bird(3), bird(4), bird(5), mam(6), mam(7), mam(8), mam(9), bat(10), superpen(11),
pen(X) → bird(X),
superpen(X) → pen(X),
bat(X) →mam(X),
where pen stands for penguin and mam stands for mammal. Assume the following set of positive and negative examples
concerning the predicate ﬂies are given:
E+ = {3,4,5,10,11} ≡ {ﬂies(3),ﬂies(4),ﬂies(5),ﬂies(10),ﬂies(11)},
E− = {1,2,6,7,8,9} ≡ {¬ﬂies(1),¬ﬂies(2),¬ﬂies(6),¬ﬂies(7),¬ﬂies(8),¬ﬂies(9)}.
Using the technique of [20] we will learn the following set of defaults D:
δ1 = bird(X) : ﬂies(X)∧¬pen(X)
ﬂies(X)
, δ2 = pen(X) : ¬ﬂies(X)∧¬superpen(X)¬ﬂies(X) ,
δ3 = superpen(X) : ﬂies(X)
ﬂies(X)
, δ4 = bat(X) : ﬂies(X)
ﬂies(X)
, δ5 = mam(X) : ¬ﬂies(X)∧¬bat(X)¬ﬂies(X) .
Let  be (D,W ) where D and W are as deﬁned above. Assume that the set of facts W ins = {bird(12), ¬ﬂies(12)} is added
to the theory  so that the theory ins = (D,W ∪ W ins) is obtained. Then, in the theory ins the set L = {bird(12)} is an
outlier with witness S = {¬ﬂies(12)}. Indeed, ′ = (D,W ∪ W insS ) is such that ′ | ﬂies(12) by means of the default rule
bird(X):ﬂies(X)∧¬pen(X)
ﬂies(X) , and 
′′ = (D,W ∪ W insS,L) is such that ′′ 
| ﬂies(12), since bird(12) is no longer entailed by ′′ .
An outlier may indicate that something is functioning wrong and that some actions are to be taken. In the example at
hand, the individual 12 could be unhealthy and thus requires to be cured. If it is believed that the outlier must be “removed”
from the knowledge base, then this can be basically accomplished using two different procedures, that we describe next in
the context of the example at hand. According to the ﬁrst procedure, it is acknowledged that the bird 12 is a penguin and,
hence, the literal pen(12) is added to the theory ins. According to the second procedure, it is recognized that 12 cannot ﬂy
since one of its wings is broken. Consequently, the fact sick(12) is added to the set W , 12 is added to the set of negative
examples, and a novel set of defaults Drev (taking into account this kind of exception) will be learned. In particular, the set
Drev will differ from the set D since the default rules δ1 and δ2 will be replaced by the two following ones:
δrev1 =
bird(X) : ﬂies(X)∧¬pen(X)∧¬sick(X)
ﬂies(X)
, and
δrev2 =
pen(X)∨ sick(X) : ¬ﬂies(X)∧¬superpen(X)
¬ﬂies(X) .
3 A slightly different deﬁnition was also provided by the same authors in [42].
4 The reader is referred to [20] for more details.
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theory, and assume some set of facts W ′ is added to it. Assume that {¬p(c)} ⊆ W ′ is an outlier witness set for an outlier
L ⊆ (W ∪ W ′). Then, it is the case that (D,W ∪ W ′{¬p(c)}) | p(c), that is, that c behaves as a positive example, while we
have stated the exact opposite, that is, we have ¬p(c) as a negative example provided with the update set W ′ . A similar
reasoning can be followed in case where the witness set is {p(c)}.
3.3.2. A biological rule database
For several reasons, the realm of biology is quite interesting for applying outlier detection techniques. First of all, rules
in biology often have exceptions. Second, the domain is not completely known. Third, knowledge base and data base tools
in bioinformatics applications are critically needed [44].
With the aid of a biologist, we formalized the following knowledge base about the “central dogma” of molecular biology,
that is, the process according to which DNA sequences are translated into proteins. The knowledge base bio = (Dbio,W bio)
is as follows:
Rule1 :
DNA(S) : ¬transRNA(S)
¬transRNA(S) Normally a generic DNA sequence is not transcribed to RNA.
Rule2 :
DNA(S)∧ prom(S) : transRNA(S)
transRNA(S)
Normally a DNA sequence having a promotor is transcribed to RNA.
Rule3 :
transRNA(S)∧ RBS(S) : transProtein(S)
transProtein(S)
Normally a transcribed DNA sequence that has a Ribosomal Binding
Site is translated into a protein.
Rule4 :
transProtein(S) : ¬deg(S)
¬deg(S) Normally a translated protein is not degradated.
Rule5 :
DNA(S) : ¬prom(S)
¬prom(S) Normally a DNA sequence doesn’t have a promotor.
Rule6 :
transRNA(S) : ¬RBS(S)
¬RBS(S) Normally a transcriptable RNA sequence has not a Ribosomal BindingSite.
Rule7 :
recDeg(S) : foundSubseq(S)
foundSubseq(S)
Normally, if a protein degradated just recently, some broken subse-
quences are found in the wet lab experimental sample.
Rule8 :
transProtein(S)∧¬deg(S) : foundProtein(S)
foundProtein(S)
Normally when a sequence is translated into a protein and the protein
is not degradated, the protein is found in the experimental sample.
Rule9 :
: ¬foundProtein(S)
¬foundProtein(S) Normally proteins are not found in experimental samples.
Rule10 :
old(S) : ¬foundSubseq(S)
¬foundSubseq(S) Normally if a degradated protein is an old one no subsequences arefound.
Rule11 : prom(S)∧ rep(S) → ¬transRNA(S) It is known that if a repressor binds the promotor region of a DNA
sequence, then the sequence is not transcribed.
Rule12 : ¬prom(S) → ¬transRNA(S) It is known that if no promoter region is in a DNA sequence, it is not
transcribed.
Rule13 : deg(S) → recDeg(S)∨ old(S) It is known that degradated proteins are those which are either degra-
dated recently or very old ones.
Rule14 : foundSubseq(S) → deg(S) It is known that if some broken subsequences are found in the experi-
mental sample the protein is degradated.
Assume, now, that the results of two different wet lab experiments are encoded in the two following sets of literals:
W exp1 =
{
DNA(seqA),prom(seqA),RBS(seqA),¬foundProtein(seqA)}, and
W exp2 =
{
DNA(seqB),prom(seqB), rep(seqB),RBS(seqB), foundSubseq(seqB), foundProtein(seqB)
}
.
Then in the theory (Dbio,W bio ∪ W exp1 ) the sets {DNA(seqA)}, {prom(seqA)}, and {RBS(seqA)} are all outliers with witness{¬foundProtein(seqA)}. Indeed, these sets include all the indications that protein should be found. Therefore, it might be
concluded that a repressor binds the promotor region of the DNA sequence or the protein is degradated.
Also in the theory (Dbio,W bio ∪ W exp2 ) there are outliers. In particular, L = {rep(seqB), foundSubseq(seqB)} is a minimal
outlier having witness S = {foundProtein(seqB)}. In fact, it is surprising that the protein is found whereas a repressor is
present and some broken subsequences are found in the lab sample.
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Complexity results for outlier detection
Query Theory
Normal default EDLP Normal DF default ELP
Outlier 	P3-complete 	
P
2-complete
Outlier[k] 	P3-complete 	P2-complete
Outlier(L) 	P3-complete 	
P
2-complete
Outlier(S) DP2-complete D
P-complete
Outlier[k](S) DP2-complete DP-complete
Outlier(S)(L) DP2-complete D
P-complete
Outlier-min(L) DP3-complete D
P
2-complete
Outlier-min(S)(L) 
P3-complete 

P
2-complete
4. Complexity results
In this section we study the computational complexity underlying outlier detection problems. Formal proofs of the results
we present are reported in Appendix A (for results of Section 4.2 concerning default theories) and Appendix B (for results of
Section 4.3 concerning extended (disjunctive) logic programs). Below we provide all the theorems together with an informal
outline of the proofs. To start with, we deﬁne the outlier detection problems we are going to analyze.
4.1. Outlier detection queries and result summary
In order to analyze the computational complexity underlying outlier detection we refer to some decision problems, called
queries, which are deﬁned next. These queries refer to a given knowledge base KB, where KB is either a default theory
 = (D,W ) or an EDLP rule-observations program P = (D,W ):
– Outlier: Given KB, does there exist at least one outlier set in KB?
– Outlier[k]: Let k be a constant positive integer. Given KB, does there exist at least one outlier set with cardinality of
at most k in KB?
– Outlier(L): Given KB and a set of literals L ⊆ W , is L an outlier in KB?
– Outlier(S): Given KB and a set of literals S ⊆ W , is S a witness for some outlier set L in KB?
– Outlier[k](S): Let k be a constant positive integer. Given KB and a set of literals S ⊆ W , is S a witness for any outlier
set L of cardinality of at most k in KB?
– Outlier(S)(L): Given KB, a set of literals S ⊆ W , and a set of literals L ⊆ W , is L an outlier with witness S in KB?
Furthermore, we are interested in the complexity of some of the above-deﬁned problems when only minimal outliers are to
be singled out. Thus, we also consider the following two additional queries:
– Outlier-min(L): Given KB and a set of literals L ⊆ W , is L a minimal outlier in KB (that is, there is no other outlier
L′ in KB such that L′ ⊆ L)?
– Outlier-min(S)(L): Given KB, a set of literals S ⊆ W , and a set of literals L ⊆ W , is L a minimal outlier and is S a
witness set for L in KB?
Note that the complexity of a query asking for the existence of a minimal outlier set is obviously the same as that of
query Outlier, since an outlier exists in a given theory if and only if a minimal one is there as well.
Complexity results are summarized in Table 1 and explained below. It is clear from Table 1 that answering outlier
detection problems on propositional normal general (disjunction-free, resp.) default theories turns out to be as hard as
answering them on propositional disjunctive (non-disjunctive, resp.) extended logic programs.
4.2. Complexity of outlier detection using Reiter’s default logic
In this subsection we analyze the complexity associated with detecting outliers in general and in DF propositional de-
fault logic. We preliminarily notice that all the membership results have been established for general theories and general
disjunction-free theories, while hardness results have been established for a strict subset of them, that is, normal theories.
Hence, complexity results hold overall for both normal default theories and general default theories.
We start our analysis with the query Outlier, the most general of the set. Given a default theory, this query asks whether
there exists an outlier in the theory.
Theorem 4.1. On propositional default theories, Outlier is	P-complete for general default theories, and	P-complete for DF theories.3 2
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theory  = (D,W ), where C denotes a suitable complexity class, can be proved by building a nondeterministic Turing
machine T that simultaneously guesses two disjoint subsets L and S = {s1, . . . , sn} of W , and then veriﬁes that
– (D,WS ) | ¬s1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬sn (entailment problem q′), and
– (D,WS,L) 
| ¬s1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬sn (entailment problem q′′).
Let Ce be the complexity class of the entailment problem for . Then the problem q′ is in the class Ce , while the problem
q′′ is in the class co-Ce . Thus, T can employ a Ce oracle to solve both q′ and q′′ . Hence, the query Outlier is in the class
C = NPCe . Recall that the entailment problem is in 
P2 = co-	P2 for general propositional default theories [27,54], and is in
co-NP for DF propositional default theories [33]. As a consequence, query Outlier belongs to the classes NP	
P
2 = 	P3 and
NPNP = 	P2 for general propositional default theories and for DF propositional default theories, respectively.
Completeness is proved by reducing the 	Pk -complete (k ∈ {2,3}) problem of deciding the validity of a QBEk,∃ formula
to Outlier. The reader is referred to the Appendix for the detailed proof. 
Let us now turn to analyzing the second query. Given a theory and a positive integer number k, the query Outlier[k]
asks for the existence of an outlier of size at most k in the theory. The complexity of this query is stated below.
Theorem 4.2. On propositional default theories, Outlier[k] is 	P3-complete for general theories, and 	P2-complete for propositional
DF default theories.
Proof outline. Bounding the size of the outlier does not change the complexity of singling it out. Indeed, as for the member-
ship, both a witness set S and an outlier set L such that |L| k can be guessed, and the rest of the proof follows the same
line of reasoning outlined above for Theorem 4.1. As for hardness, the construction referred to in Theorem 4.1 still holds as
well, since the outlier set L we employ in the proof has size 1 and, hence, complies with any possible value of k. 
Next, we focus on query Outlier(L). It turns out that knowing the outlier set L in advance does not reduce the com-
plexity w.r.t. the general Outlier query since, in particular, the number of possible outlier witness sets S ⊆ WL for L is still
exponential. This is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3. On propositional default theories, Outlier(L) is 	P3-complete for general theories, and 	
P
2-complete for DF theories.
Proof outline. The same as for Theorem 4.1. 
Given a default theory and a set of literals S , query Outlier(S) asks whether S is a witness set for any outlier in the
theory. It turns out that the complexity of Outlier(S) is lower than the complexity of Outlier. This is so because, once
the candidate outlier witness set S is given, there is no need to check all the potential outlier witnesses (and there is an
exponential number of potential witnesses). The result is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4. On propositional default theories, Outlier(S) is DP2-complete for general theories and D
P-complete for DF theories.
Proof outline. In order to prove membership we refer, again, to the entailment problems q′ and q′′ introduced in the proof
outline of Theorem 4.1, but this time the outlier witness set S is ﬁxed in advance. We recall that for general propositional
default theories, q′ is in 
P2, while for DF propositional default theories, it is in co-NP. As for problem q′′ , it is in 	P2 and in
NP for general theories and for DF theories, respectively, provided that L is known (these are standard entailment problems
for general and DF default theories). However, it is possible to show that q′′ belongs to those classes also when L is un-
known. Indeed, q′′ can be answered by showing that there exists a set L in WS and an extension E of the theory (D,WS,L)
such that ¬S /∈ E . Thus, a nondeterministic polynomial time Turing machine TM can be built that guesses simultaneously
the set L ⊆ WS , the subset DE ⊆ D of generating defaults of an extension E of (D,WS,L), and an ordering of the rules
in DE . Then, TM proceeds as follows:
– for general propositional default theories, TM uses an NP oracle (a) to check the conditions that DE must satisfy to be
a set of generating defaults for E , and (b) to verify that ¬s1 ∧ · · · ∧¬sn /∈ E . These steps can be performed by executing
a polynomially bounded number of calls to the NP oracle;
– for DF default theories, TM (a) checks the conditions that DE must satisfy to be a set of generating defaults for an
extension E of a disjunction-free theory, and (b) veriﬁes that ¬s1 ∧ · · · ∧¬sn /∈ E , by checking that for every i, 1 i  n,
¬si is not the conclusion of any default in DE . These steps can be performed in polynomial time.
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P2 and 	
P
2 and,
therefore, it is in DP2. For DF default theories, Outlier(S) is the conjunction of two independent problems, one from co-NP,
the other from NP and, hence, Outlier(S) is in DP.
As for hardness, we consider the following decision problem, which we call problem q. Given two independent default
theories 1 and 2, and two letters s1 and s2, the problem q is to verify whether the following is true:
(1 | s1)∧ (2 
| s2) (problem q).
For general propositional default theories, q is a DP2-complete problem, since testing whether 1 | s1 is 
P2-complete, while
the problem of testing 2 
| s2 is 	P2-complete [27,54]. For DF propositional default theories, q is a DP-complete problem,
since testing 1 | s1 is co-NP-complete, while testing 2 
| s2 is NP-complete [33]. Then, hardness of query Outlier(S) is
proven by reducing q to query Outlier(S). Given an instance of q, a default theory (q) = (D(q),W (q)) is associated with
q such that ¬s1, s2 ∈ W (q), and q is true iff {¬s1} is an outlier witness set for {s2} in (q). 
The following result shows that, similarly to what was shown for query Outlier, bounding the size of the outlier set to
be associated with the provided witness set S in advance does not change the complexity ﬁgures.
Theorem 4.5. On propositional default theories, Outlier[k](S) is DP2-complete for general theories, and DP-complete for DF theories.
Proof outline. Both membership and hardness can be proved as discussed above for Theorem 4.4. To prove membership it
suﬃces to guess only outlier sets with size of at most k. As for hardness, the reduction proceeds as described in the proof
outline of Theorem 4.4, since outlier witness sets employed in the construction are singleton sets. 
Next, we analyze the query Outlier(S)(L). Note that this query is important because it might be the basic operator in
a system for outlier detection using propositional default theories. We recall that, given a default theory and two sets of
literals S and L, this query “simply” asks if S is an outlier witness set for the outlier L in that theory.
Theorem 4.6. On propositional default theories, Outlier(S)(L) is DP2-complete for general theories, and D
P-complete for DF theories.
Proof outline. Complexity of query Outlier(S)(L) is the same as that of query Outlier(S). Similarly to what happens for
query Outlier(L) with respect to query Outlier, knowing the outlier set L in advance does not reduce the complexity
of Outlier(S)(L) with respect to query Outlier(S). Indeed, recall that even if sets L and S are ﬁxed, it is nonetheless
needed to solve entailment problems q′ and q′′ deﬁned in the proof outline of Theorem 4.1, which are, respectively, 
P2-
complete (co-NP-complete, resp.) and 	P2-complete (NP-complete, resp.) for propositional general (DF, resp.) default theories.
Hence, the result. 
Given a default theory and a set of literals L, the query Outlier-min(L) asks whether L is a minimal outlier set in the
theory. Although the outlier set is given as input to this query, Outlier-min(L) turns out to be the most complex of the
outlier detection problems considered in this work, even more complex than the general Outlier query.
Theorem 4.7. Outlier-min(L) on propositional default theories is DP3-complete for general theories, and D
P
2-complete for DF theories.
Proof outline. The membership part of the theorem can be proved as follows. First, consider the problem of verifying that L
is indeed an outlier, that is, that there exists a witness set S ⊆ WL for L. It has been shown in Theorem 4.3 that Outlier(L)
is 	P3-complete for general default theories and 	
P
2-complete for DF theories. Once veriﬁed that L is an outlier it must
be further shown that L is a minimal outlier, i.e., that for each nonempty subset L′ of L and for each subset S ′ of WL′ ,
L′ and S ′ together do not satisfy Deﬁnition 3.2. The negation of the latter problem can be solved by a polynomial time
nondeterministic Turing machine with an oracle for the entailment problem that guesses the two subsets L′ and S ′ and
then veriﬁes if they indeed satisfy Deﬁnition 3.2. As a consequence, the problem is in 
P3 for general default theories and
in 
P2 for DF theories.
It can be concluded that the overall query Outlier-min(L) on general (resp. DF) theories is the conjunction of two
independent problems, one from 	P3 (resp. 	
P
2) and one from 

P
3 (resp. 

P
2) and, thus it lies in D
P
3 (resp. D
P
2).
Hardness of query Outlier-min(L) for general theories is proved by reducing the problem of deciding the validity of a
formula
F = ((∃X)(∀Y )(∃Z) f (X, Y , Z))∧ ((∀W )(∃U )(∀V )g(W ,U , V ))
to the problem Outlier-min(L). Within F , f (X, Y , Z) is a Boolean formula in conjunctive normal form and g(X, Y , Z) is
a Boolean formula in disjunctive normal form. Formula F is the conjunction of a QBE3,∃ and a QBE3,∀ and, hence, this
reduction establishes the completeness of Outlier-min(L) on general theories for the class DP. A similar reduction, but3
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default theories. 
Let us now consider the query Outlier-min(S)(L). Recall that given a default theory and two disjoint sets S and L, this
query asks if L is a minimal outlier set having S as a witness set in the theory. Note that this query is at least as complex as
query Outlier(S)(L) that checks whether L and S represent a pair of outlier (not necessarily a minimal one) and a witness.
The precise complexity is stated next.
Theorem 4.8. Outlier-min(S)(L) on propositional default theories is 
P3-complete for general theories, and 

P
2-complete for DF
theories.
Proof outline. Let us ﬁrst consider membership. In order to answer the query Outlier-min(S)(L) it must be veriﬁed that (a)
S and L satisfy Deﬁnition 3.2, i.e., (D,WS ) | ¬S and (D,WS,L) 
| ¬S , and (b) for each subset L′ of L, and S ′ of WL′ , S ′ and
L′ do not satisfy Deﬁnition 3.2, i.e. (D,WS ′ ) 
| ¬S ′ or (D,WS ′,L′) | ¬S ′ . The former query coincides with Outlier(S)(L),
and hence it is in DP2 (resp. D
P) for general (resp. DF) theories. Vice versa, the query at (b) is in 
P3 (resp. 

P
2) for general
(resp. DF) theories, since its negation can be answered by a nondeterministic polynomial time Turing machine that guesses
a pair of disjoint subsets L′ ⊆ L and S ′ ⊆ WL′ and then checks that they form an outlier and witness pair by using an oracle
in 	P2 . Thus, the overall problem is in 

P
3 (resp. 

P
2).
As for hardness, in the case of general (resp., DF) theories, it is proved by reducing the problem of deciding the validity
of a QBE3,∀ (resp., QBE2,∀) formula to query Outlier-min(S)(L). 
4.3. Complexity results for extended (disjunctive) logic programs
This section discusses the complexity of detecting outliers when ELPs (Section 4.3.1) and EDLPs (Section 4.3.2) are con-
sidered.
4.3.1. Complexity of outlier detection in extended logic programs
Extended logic programs, for which disjunction is not allowed, correspond to a subset of default theories. The correspon-
dence between the two languages is as follows [26]. For each ELP rule r:
L0 ← L1, . . . , Lm, not Lm+1, . . . , not Ln
let δ(r) denote the following default rule:
L1 ∧ · · · ∧ Lm : ¬Lm+1, . . . ,¬Ln
L0
,
where the justiﬁcation of δ(r) is the identically true literal true if r has no negation as failure literals (i.e., if n =m). Then,
with every ELP P , we can associate a default theory P = ({δ(r) | r ∈ P },∅) such that the following holds [26]:
(i) If M is an answer set of P , then the deductive closure of M is an extension of P , and
(ii) every extension of P is the deductive closure of exactly one answer set of P .
In the sequel, given an ELP rule-observations program P = (D,W ), (P ) will denote the associated default theory ({δ(r) |
r ∈ D},W ). Note that (P ) is disjunction-free. Similarly, given a disjunction-free default theory  = (D,W ) such that for
each δ ∈ D , the consequent of δ is a literal and there is no conjunction in the justiﬁcation of δ, P () will denote the
associated rule-observations program ({r | δ(r) ∈ D},W ).
In order to state following complexity results, a technical Lemma is needed.
Lemma 4.9. Let P = (D,W ) be an ELP rule-observations program and let(P ) be its associated DF default theory. Then L is an outlier
set in P with witness set S iff L is an outlier set in (P ) with witness set S.
Proof. By the relationship holding between the answer sets of the ELP P and the extensions of the default theory P stated
in [26] (and recalled above), it follows that given an ELP rule-observations program P = (D,W ), for each subset Z of W
the answer sets of P Z are in one-to-one correspondence with the extensions of (D ′,WZ ) where (D ′,W ) = (P ). 
All that given, the complexity results for general ELPs can be summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.10. The complexities of outlier detection problems over ELP are as follows:
– Outlier, Outlier[k], and Outlier(L) are 	P2-complete;
– Outlier-min is DP2-complete and Outlier-min(S)(L) is 

P
2-complete, and
– Outlier(S), Outlier[k](S), and Outlier(S)(L) are DP-complete.
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default theory whose size is polynomially-bounded in the size of P . Thus, the claim follows from Lemma 4.9 and the
membership parts of Theorems 4.1–4.8.
(Hardness) Given a normal DF default theory  = (D,W ) such that for each δ ∈ D , δ has the form L1∧···∧Lm :L0L0 , P () is
an ELP rule-observations program whose size is, by construction, polynomially bounded in the size of . Hence, hardness
follows from Lemma 4.9 and the hardness parts of Theorems 4.1–4.8 concerning DF default theories. Indeed, we recall that
all the hardness parts of these theorems make use of a normal DF default theory such that the conclusion, and hence the
justiﬁcation, of each default rule occurring in it consists in a single literal. 
4.3.2. Complexity of outlier detection in disjunctive extended logic programs
We have analyzed the complexity of outlier detection problems for extended logic programs by exploiting results ob-
tained for default theories. However, the more general class of extended disjunctive logic programs cannot be mapped to the
language of default theories. Therefore, we are not able to directly exploit the complexity results proved for default logics
in order to derive correspondent results for EDLPs. Nevertheless, it turns out that outlier detection problems on EDLPs are
precisely just as hard as the corresponding tasks evaluated on default logics, as summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.11. For general EDLPs, queries (1) Outlier, (2) Outlier[k], and (3) Outlier(L) are 	P3-complete, queries
(4) Outlier(S), (5) Outlier[k](S), and (6) Outlier(S)(L) are DP2-complete, query (7) Outlier-min(L) is DP3-complete, and query
(8) Outlier-min(S)(L) is 
P3-complete.
Proof outline. (1) Membership in 	P3 follows since, given a rule-observation pair P = (D,W ), the query can be answered by
a polynomial-time nondeterministic Turing machine that guesses the outlier set L and the witness set W and then employs
a 	P2 oracle to decide P S | ¬S (a 
P2 problem) and P S,L 
| ¬S (a 	P2 problem).
	P3-hardness is proved by reducing the problem of the validity of a QBE3,∃ formula to query Outlier. The reduction
associates a negation-free EDLP rule-observation pair P () = (D(),W ()) with a QBE3,∃ formula  = ∃X∀Y∃Z f (X, Y , Z)
in conjunctive normal form. The properties of P () are analogous to the properties of the default theory () which were
described when discussing query Outlier on default theories (see Theorem 4.1). However, differently from Theorem 4.1, a
saturation technique is employed to guarantee those properties.
(2) and (3) The proof uses the same ideas illustrated for query Outlier.
(4) Membership in DP2 can be proved by taking into account that the problem corresponds to the conjunction of two
independent problems, namely, deciding whether P S | ¬S and whether P S,L 
| ¬S . While the former problem is in 
P2, it
can be shown that the latter is in 	P2 even though L is not provided as input to the problem. Indeed, one can proceed by
guessing together the outlier set L and a (minimal) model M of P S,L such that ¬S 
⊆ M and then checking that it is indeed
minimal by exploiting an NP oracle.
DP2-hardness is proved by reducing to query Outlier(S) the problem of deciding whether a program P
′ is consistent (a
	P2 check) and a program P
′′ is inconsistent (a 
P2 check).
(5) and (6) The results can be proved using the same line of reasoning as illustrated above for query Outlier(S).
(7) Membership is analogous to that of Theorem 4.7. As for the hardness, the line of reasoning is analogous to that
of the hardness part of Point 1 of Theorem 4.7, but, from a technical point of view, the construction used in Point 1 of
Theorem 4.11, where a 	P3-complete problem is taken into account, is employed. Loosely speaking, two sets of rules, r
′ and
r′′ , representing two distinct copies of the program used in the reduction shown in Point 1 of this theorem, are used in
order to build a logic rule-observations program P (F ) such that the conjunction F = ∧ of a QBE3,∃ formula  (encoded
via rules r′) and of a QBE3,∀ formula  (encoded via rules r′′) is valid if and only if a suitable set L is a minimal outlier set
in P (F ).
(8) Both membership and hardness are analogous to that of Theorem 4.8 and the hardness exploits rules r′′ used in
Point 7 of this proof. 
5. The ﬁrst-order case
We now discuss the extension of our framework to the ﬁrst-order case, where variables are allowed to occur in defaults.
We will use a formal framework which is similar in several aspects to the one set down by Cadoli et al. [15].
A ﬁnite ﬁrst-order default theory  = (D,W ) consists of a ﬁnite set W of ﬁrst-order formulas and of a ﬁnite set D of
default rules of the form (1), with the prerequisite, justiﬁcations, and consequence being ﬁrst-order formulas with free
variables among those in X= X1, . . . , Xn . A default is closed if none of α,β1, . . . , βn , and γ contains free variables. A default
theory is closed if all the formulas in W and in D are closed. A default or default theory which is not closed is called open.
It is assumed that the Herbrand Universe U of a ﬁnite default theory is nonempty and ﬁnite (hence, no function symbols
are allowed to occur in the theory). In the following we will consider only ﬁnite ﬁrst-order default theories.
The semantics of a closed ﬁrst-order default theory is based on the notion of extension, whose deﬁnition is analogous
to the deﬁnition of extension provided in Section 2.1 in the context of a propositional default theory [15]. The deﬁnition of
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of closed defaults obtained by replacing those free variables with terms of the Herbrand Universe U of the default theory.
Let φ(X) be a formula whose free variables are among X= X1, . . . , Xn , and let ζ = ζ1, . . . , ζn be a list of objects from U .
Then, we denote by φ[X/ζ ] the result of simultaneously substituting ζi for Xi in φ, for all i = 1, . . . ,n. Let  = (D,W ) be a
ﬁrst-order default theory. We denote by INST(W ) the instantiation of W , which is the set of closed formulas{
φ[X/ζ ] | φ(X) ∈ W , ζ ∈ Un}.
Similarly, we denote by INST(D) the instantiation of D , which is the set of closed defaults{
α[X/ζ ] : β1[X/ζ ], . . . , βm[X/ζ ]
γ [X/ζ ] |
α(X) : β1(X), . . . , βm(X)
γ (X)
∈ D, ζ ∈ Un
}
,
and serves the purpose of eliminating free variables from the formulas.
The instantiation INST() of  is (INST(D), INST(W )). For example, consider a group of friends who have to decide
whether to go together to watch a movie or not, given that some of them do not like going to the movies. This is encoded
in the theory ex = (D,W ), where
D =
{
(∃X)(¬likes(X, Y )) : ¬watch(Y )
¬watch(Y )
}
, and
W = {likes(mary,movie),¬likes(jennie,movie),watch(movie)}.
Then U = {mary, jennie,movie}, and the instantiation INST(ex) of ex is such that INST(W ) = W and INST(D) is{
(∃X)(¬likes(X,mary)) : ¬watch(mary)
¬watch(mary) ,
(∃X)(¬likes(X, jennie)) : ¬watch(jennie)
¬watch(jennie) ,
(∃X)(¬likes(X,movie)) : ¬watch(movie)
¬watch(movie)
}
.
Now we are in a position to extend the deﬁnition of outlier in the context of ﬁrst-order default theories.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (First-order outliers and outlier witness set). Let  = (D,W ) be a ﬁrst-order default theory and let L ⊆ W be a
set of ground literals. If there exists a nonempty set of ground literals S ⊆ WL such that:
(i) (INST(D), INST(W )S ) | ¬S , and
(ii) (INST(D), INST(W )S,L) 
| ¬S
then we say that L is an outlier set in  and S is an outlier witness set for L in .
For example, consider the theory ex above. Then L = {¬likes(jennie,movie)} is an outlier with the witness S =
{watch(movie)}.
Given a ﬁnite default theory , the instantiation of  contains only closed formulas but it is not in general a ground theory,
due to the possible presence of quantiﬁers. A ﬁnite propositional default theory can be anyway associated with  as follows.
Let F = ∀Xφ(X) (F = ∃Xφ(X), resp.) be a universally (existentially, resp.) quantiﬁed formula. Then, the propositional
version PROP(F ) of F (under Domain Closure) is the formula
∧
ζ∈U φ(ζ ) (
∨
ζ∈U φ(ζ ), resp.). The propositional version
PROP(φ) of a quantiﬁer-free formula φ is the formula φ itself. Let φ be a formula, then propositional version PROP(φ) of φ is
obtained by recursively substituting each subformula ψ of φ with its propositional version PROP(ψ).
Let  = (D,W ) be a ﬁrst-order default theory. We denote by PROP(W ) the propositional version of W , which is the set
of propositional formulas{
PROP(φ) | φ ∈ INST(W )}.
Similarly, we denote by INST(D) the propositional version of D , which is the set of propositional defaults{
PROP(α) : PROP(β1), . . . ,PROP(βm)
PROP(γ )
| α : β1, . . . , βm
γ
∈ INST(D)
}
.
The propositional version PROP() of  is the propositional default theory (PROP(D),PROP(W )). Since it has been assumed
that the Herbrand Universe U of the theory  is ﬁnite, the propositional default theory PROP() is ﬁnite. For example,
consider the theory ex above. The propositional version PROP(ex) of ex is such that PROP(W ) = W and PROP(D) is{¬likes(mary,movie)∨¬likes(jennie,movie)∨¬likes(movie,movie) : ¬watch(movie)
¬watch(movie) ,
¬likes(mary,mary)∨¬likes(jennie,mary)∨¬likes(movie,mary) : ¬watch(mary)
¬watch(mary) ,
¬likes(mary, jennie)∨¬likes(john, jennie)∨¬likes(movie, jennie) : ¬watch(jennie)}
.¬watch(jennie)
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of PROP(), if L is an outlier with witness S in  then L in an outlier with witness S in the propositional default theory
PROP(). The converse holds provided that outliers and witnesses are constrained to be subsets of W ∩ PROP(W ).5 We
have already remarked that constraining outliers and witnesses to be singled out from a given subset of set of literals
in W does not change the complexity ﬁgures. Thus, if PROP() is a ﬁnite propositional default theory, complexity results of
Section 4.2 can be directly applied to the case in which the input theory is PROP(). Thus, the complexity analysis presented
in Section 4.2 allows us to characterize the diﬃculty of the mining problem at hand once the propositional version of the
ﬁrst-order theory is available.
For example, consider the theory ex = (D,W ). Since PROP(W ) = W , the outliers in the propositional theory PROP(ex)
are in one-to-one correspondence with the outliers in the ﬁrst-order theory ex.
As a matter of fact, it must be recalled that the theory PROP() can be exponentially larger than . And, indeed, it can
be seen that, due to the exponential increase of the size of the theory, the complexity of deciding the existence of an outlier
in a ﬁrst-order theory is in NEXPTIME	
P
2 , which is the exponential analogue for 	P3 = NP	
P
2 .
Furthermore, as we have already pointed out, our approach is to regard outlier detection as a data mining technique, and
therefore we mine from explicitly observed facts belonging to W . These facts can be very naturally regarded as tuples of
a database from which we are interested in singling out anomalies. In the database scenario, a rather pertinent issue is to
characterize the data complexity [57], i.e., the complexity of query evaluation when the database is assumed to vary, whereas
the query expression is assumed to be ﬁxed. Next, we are going to address this issue in the context of outlier detection in
default theories scenario.
Let  = (D,W ) be a ﬁrst-order default theory. We denote by W fact the extensional component of , that is the subset
of W consisting in all the ground literals in W . The extensional component can be assimilated to a relational database. The
ﬁrst-order component of  is, conversely, the set W rule = W \ W fact.
Deﬁnition 5.2 (Data complexity of outlier detection queries). The data complexity of an outlier query Q , where Q is one of
the queries deﬁned in Section 4.1, when the knowledge base is a ﬁrst-order default theory  = (D,W rule ∪ W fact), is the
complexity of deciding Q measured in the size of the extensional component W fact of .
In other words, the data complexity of Q is the complexity of answering Q on a ﬁrst-order default theory, under the
assumption that the set of default rules and the ﬁrst-order component are held ﬁxed and the only component allowed to
vary is the extensional one.
Next we show that under data complexity measure, the query Outlier is 	P3-complete, that is, it has the same complexity
as that of its propositional counterpart.
Theorem 5.3. The data complexity of Outlier is 	P3-complete.
Proof outline. Consider membership. Given a ﬁrst-order default theory  = (D,W rule ∪ W fact), let k be the maximum
number of variables occurring in a default rule in D or in a formula in W rule, and let n be the number of distinct elements
in the Herbrand Universe U of . The number n is at most linear in the size of the extensional component W fact of ,
that is n = O(|W fact|). Hence, assuming that D and W rule are not part of the input, the size of the theory PROP() is O(nk),
hence polynomial in the size of W fact which is the input of the Outlier query. In order to complete the proof, it is suﬃcient
to recall that the query Outlier for ﬁnite general propositional default theories is in 	P3 , as shown in the membership part
of Theorem 4.1, Point 1.
As for hardness, it can be shown (see the appendix for details) that there exists a ﬁxed set of default rules DFO and
a ﬁxed set of non-atomic formulas W FO, together with a mapping which given as input a QBE3,∃ formula  outputs a
set W () of ground atoms, such that the theory PROP((FO,W FO ∪ W ())) is equivalent to the propositional theory ()
described in the hardness part of Theorem 4.1, Point 1. The rest of the proof then follows from the above mentioned
theorem. Details of the reduction are reported in the appendix. 
The construction described in the proof of Theorem 5.3 can be used to adapt the other reductions depicted in the
hardness part of theorems concerning general propositional default theories in order to obtain reductions valid under the
data complexity measure. Therefore, we obtain:
Theorem 5.4. The data complexity of (i) Outlier is 	P3-complete; (ii) Outlier[k] and Outlier(L) is 	P3-complete; (iii) Outlier(S),
Outlier[k](S), and Outlier(S)(L) is DP2-complete; (iv) Outlier-min(L) is DP3-complete, and (v) Outlier-min(S)(L) is
P3-complete.
By construction, both Theorems 5.3 and 5.4 hold for ﬁnite normal ﬁrst-order default theories.
5 From a technical point of view, the transformation PROP() can be modiﬁed so that both directions hold immediately. To this aim it suﬃces to replace
open (and, in the case there is a single constant in U , also non-ground) literals  in W with formulas of the form f ∨¬ f → .
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Research related to the work presented in this paper can be divided into three groups: (i) abduction, (ii) outlier detection
from data, and (iii) outlier detection using logic programming under stable model semantics.
6.1. Abduction
The research on logic-based abduction [16,19,22,23,32,39,47,51,52] is related to outlier detection. Generally speaking,
in the framework of logic-based abduction, the domain knowledge is described using a logical theory T . A subset X of
hypotheses is an abduction explanation to a set of manifestations M if T ∪ X is a consistent theory that entails M .
The work by Eiter, Gottlob, and Leone on abduction from default theories [24] is very relevant to the work presented
here. In that paper, the authors present a basic model of abduction from default logic and analyze the complexity of some
associated abductive reasoning tasks. They also present two modes of abduction: one based on brave reasoning and the
other on cautious reasoning. According to [24], a default abduction problem (DAP) is a tuple 〈H,M,W , D〉 where H is a set
of ground literals called hypotheses, M is a set of ground literals called observations, and (D,W ) is a default theory. The goal
is to explain observations from M by using hypotheses in the context of the default theory (D,W ). The authors propose
the following deﬁnition for an explanation:
Deﬁnition 6.1. (See [24].) Let P = 〈H,M, D,W 〉 be a DAP and let E ⊆ H . Then, E is a skeptical explanation for P iff
(i) (D,W ∪ E) | M , and
(ii) (D,W ∪ E) has a consistent extension.
The relationship between outlier detection on normal propositional default theories and skeptical explanations is sum-
marized by the following theorem.
Theorem 6.2. Let  = (D,W ) be a normal default theory, where W is consistent. Also, let L ⊆ W and S ⊆ W be two disjoint
sets. Then S is an outlier witness set for L in  if and only if L is a minimal nonempty skeptical explanation for ¬S in the DAP
P = 〈L,¬S, D,WS,L〉.
Proof.
(i) (“Only If”) Let  = (D,W ) be a normal default theory, L ⊆ W , and S ⊆ W an outlier witness set for L. By our deﬁnition
of outlier, it must be the case that (D,WS ) | ¬S , or in other words, (D,WS,L ∪ L) | ¬S . Moreover, since (D,W ) is a
normal default theory, so is (D,WS,L ∪ L). In addition, since W is consistent, so is WS . Hence, (D,WS ) has a consistent
extension. Therefore, by Deﬁnition 6.1, L is a skeptical explanation for ¬S in the DAP P .
(ii) (“If”) Suppose L is a minimal nonempty skeptical explanation for ¬S in the DAP P = 〈L,¬S, D,WS,L〉. By deﬁnition, we
have:
(a) (D,WS ) | ¬S , and
(b) (D,WS ) has a consistent extension.
Moreover, since L is a minimal nonempty explanation, at least one of the following must be true:
(a) (D,WS,L) 
| ¬S , or
(b) (D,WS,L) does not have a consistent extension.
Since  = (D,W ) is a normal default theory and W is a consistent theory, it must be the case that  = (D,WS,L) is
also a normal default theory and WS,L is consistent. Hence, the default theory (D,WS,L) has a consistent extension.
Therefore it must be the case that (D,WS,L) 
| ¬S , and it can be concluded that S is an outlier witness set for L
in (D,W ). 
In sum, it follows that some sort of duality does hold in the context of normal default theories between abduction
and outlier detection problems. Nonetheless, in outlier detection problems, the outlier witness set S (which according to
Theorem 6.2 is the analog to the set of observations in abduction problems) has to be guessed, while the set of observations
in abduction is given in the input. We have shown in Section 4 that the high complexity of the outlier detection problems
arises from the fact that the set S is not given in advance. Hence, the fact that the witness set S is not given in input is
quite signiﬁcant from the computational complexity point of view and prevents us from borrowing complexity results from
abduction problems.
Remark 6.3. Theorem 6.2 is valid also for ordered semi-normal default theories. This is because the second condition in
Deﬁnition 6.1 requires a default theory which has at least one consistent extension, and ordered semi-normal default the-
ories are guaranteed to have this property (see [25]). For other subclasses of default theories, however, Theorem 6.2 might
not hold. Consider for example the following default theory  = (D,W ), where D = { l:¬s , ¬s:¬q∧p , ¬s:¬p∧l , ¬s:¬l∧q } and¬s p l q
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witness set. However, since (D,W {s}) does not have a consistent extension, we cannot say that {l} is a minimal nonempty
skeptical explanation for ¬{s} in the DAP P = 〈{l},¬{s}, D,W {s},{l}〉.
Research on logic-based abduction from disjunctive logic programs [22,52] is also related to outlier detection, and has
comprehensibly been studied in the context of logic programming (see [19] for a survey). This issue has been explored
in two directions. The ﬁrst line of work has used logic programs as an AI tool for knowledge representation and reasoning
about abduction, while the second approach has used the concept of abduction for deﬁning the semantics of logic programs.
In the context of disjunctive logic programming, research has focused on the relationship between semantics of DLP and
abduction-based semantics of logic programs (see, for example, [52]).
Eiter et al. [22] have studied abduction in the context of normal and disjunctive logic programs that have only one type of
negation, namely, negation by failure, but have not considered extended logic programs where both classical negation and
negation by failure are allowed. In addition, unlike our framework, the model of Eiter et al. does not allow for an explicit
exploitation of integrity constraints. Their abduction schema assumes that the inference operator is provided as an input.
Eiter et al. deﬁne a logic programming abduction problem as follows:
Deﬁnition 6.4. (See [22].) Let V be a set of propositional atoms. A logic programming abduction problem (LPAP) P over V
consists of a tuple 〈H,M, LP , |〉, where H ⊆ V is a ﬁnite set of hypotheses, M ⊆ V ∪ {¬v | v ∈ V } is a ﬁnite set of
manifestations, LP is a propositional logic program on V and | is an inference operator.
They deﬁne a solution to an LPAP as:
Deﬁnition 6.5. (See [22].) Let P = 〈H,M, LP , |〉 be an LPAP, and let S ⊆ H . Then S is a solution (or explanation) to P iff
LP ∪ S | M .
According to [22], abductive conclusions should not lead to inconsistency. Hence, they use a variant of skeptical inference
in which some answer set must exist. We cannot establish a formal relationship between outlier detection and abduction
on disjunctive logic programs because the deﬁnition of outliers requires the ability to prove negative literals in the classical
negation sense, while in the semantics used in [22], one can never prove negative literals since the program itself does not
use any negative literal.
Sakama and Inoue have deﬁned abduction in the context of EDLPs, and suggested a program transformation between
“abductive programs” and disjunctive programs [52]. However, their techniques and complexity results do not apply to the
case of outlier detection since they have investigated credulous reasoning rather than skeptical reasoning, and since in their
framework an observation is constrained to be a single literal.
However, if we use the framework of Eiter et al. as described in Deﬁnitions 6.4 and 6.5, and adapt it to a “skeptical”
version of the work of Sakama and Inoue, we can show the following.
Theorem 6.6. Let P = (D,W ) be a rule-observations program and let L, S ⊆ W . Then the following holds:
(i) If S is an outlier witness set for L in P , then L is an explanation in the LPAP A = 〈W ,¬S, P ′ = (D,WS,L), |〉, where | is
entailment from EDLPs as deﬁned in Section 2.2, and
(ii) If L is a minimal explanation in the LPAP A = 〈W ,¬S, P ′ = (D,WS,L), |〉, where | is entailment from EDLPs as deﬁned in
Section 2.2, then S is an outlier witness set for L in P .
Proof.
(i) Let P = (D,W ) be a rule-observations program and let L, S ⊆ W . Assume S is an outlier witness set for L in P . By
deﬁnition of outlier, it must be the case that (D,WS,L ∪ L) | ¬S . Then, by Deﬁnition 6.5, L is an explanation for ¬S in
the LPAP A.
(ii) Suppose L is a minimal explanation for ¬S in the LPAP A = 〈W ,¬S, P ′ = (D,W {S,L}), |〉. By Deﬁnition 6.5, it is known
that:
(D,WS,L ∪ L) | ¬S.
Therefore (D,WS ) | ¬S . Moreover, since L is a minimal explanation, the following must be true:
(D,WS,L) 
| ¬S.
Hence, it can be concluded that S is an outlier witness set for L in (D,W ). 
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Theorems 6.2 and 6.6 does not provide a technique to solve outlier detection problems using abduction, since for outlier
detection both the outlier L and its outlier witness set S have to be singled out, while in abduction both hypotheses and
observations are ﬁxed sets. In fact, outlier detection is a knowledge discovery technique: the task in outlier detection is to
learn the exceptional observations along with the information witnessing for it.
6.2. Outlier detection from data
The vast body of literature concerning outlier detection in databases largely exploits techniques borrowed from statistics,
machine learning and other ﬁelds [9,28,56]. In almost all cases, the techniques deal with data organized as a single relational
table. Often only numerical attributes are handled and a metrics relating pairs of rows in the table are ﬁrst required. These
approaches can be classiﬁed as supervised-learning methods, where each example must be labeled as exceptional or not
[37,50], and unsupervised-learning methods, where such labels are not required. The latter approach is obviously more
general. As the technique proposed in our work is unsupervised, the sequel of this section will focus on unsupervised
techniques. These techniques can be categorized into various groups.
Statistical-based methods, which assume that the given data set has a distribution model. Outliers, then, are those objects
that satisfy a discordancy test, that is, that are signiﬁcantly larger (or smaller) w.r.t. the values they are supposed to assume
according to the hypothesized distribution [9].
Deviation-based techniques identify outliers by inspecting the typical characteristics of objects and deﬁnes them as ob-
jects that deviate from those features [8,53].
A rather different technique, which ﬁnds outliers by observing low dimensional projections of the search space, is presented
in [1]. In that paper, a point is considered an outlier if it is located in some low density subspace.
Yu et al. [17] introduced a method based on wavelet transform, that identiﬁes outliers by removing clusters from the
original data set. Wavelet transform has also been used in [55] to detect outliers in stochastic processes.
A further group of methods use density-based techniques [14] and exploit a notion of locality that measures the plausi-
bility for an object to be an outlier with respect to the density of the local neighborhood. To reduce the computational load,
Jin et al. [30] proposed a method to determine only the top-n local outliers.
Distance-based outlier detection was introduced by Knorr and Ng [34,35] to overcome the limitations of statistical meth-
ods. A distance-based outlier is deﬁned as follows: A point p in a data set is an outlier with respect to parameters k and R if
at least k points in the data set lie at a distance greater than R from p. This deﬁnition generalizes the deﬁnition of outlier in
statistics and is appropriate when the data set does not ﬁt any standard distribution. Ramaswamy et al. [48] modiﬁed the
above deﬁnition of outlier. They do not provide any ranking for outliers that are singled out. The deﬁnition they suggest is
based on the distance of the kth nearest neighbor of a point p, denoted by Dk(p), and proceeds as follows: Given k and n, a
point p is an outlier if no more than n − 1 other points q in the data set have a higher value for Dk(q) than p. This means that the
points q having the n greatest Dk(q) values are singled out as outliers. A deﬁnition of outlier that considers for each point
the sum of the distances from its k nearest neighbors is proposed in [2,6,7]. The authors present an algorithm that uses the
Hilbert space-ﬁlling curve which exhibits scaling results close to linear. Similarly, a near-linear time algorithm for detection
of distance-based outliers exploiting randomization is described in [10].
The general differences and analogies between the approaches described above and the one suggested in the present
work are signiﬁcant. In fact, those approaches deal with “knowledge,” as encoded within one single relational table. In
contrast, our technique deals with complex knowledge bases, which though comprising relational-like information, generally
also include semantically richer forms of knowledge, such as axioms, default rules and so forth. Hence, in the framework
analyzed in this paper, complex relations relating objects of the underlying theory can be expressed. As a consequence,
even if the intuitive and general sense of computing outliers in the two contexts is analogous, the conceptual and technical
developments are quite different as well as the formal properties of the computed outliers.
Sometimes domain knowledge can help to single out outliers that would otherwise be diﬃcult to identify via methods
like the ones surveyed above. The following example is intended to provide some intuition about this. The example also
serves to highlight the different types of knowledge that can be mined using our approach as opposed to these others.
For this purpose, we make a comparison between our approach and a typical distance-based approach. To facilitate the
comparison, we will use an example where literals included in the evidential knowledge denote facts concerning integer
numbers.
Example 6.7. Let I = {0,1,2, . . . ,99,100}. Consider a binary predicate p(x, y), which normally is used to represent pairs
(x, y) ∈ I2 such that (a) x+ y = 100 and (b) x 
= y, and assume the following set of observations is available:
DB= {p(0,100), p(1,99), p(2,98), . . . , p(49,51), p(50,50), p(51,49), . . . , p(98,2), p(99,1), p(100,0)}.
According to the knowledge informally stated above, the literal p(50,50) is associated with an anomaly in DB , since the
pair of integers x= 50 and y = 50 satisﬁes condition (a) but not condition (b).
Now, suppose one wants to single out anomalous observations in DB. In that case, in the absence of domain knowl-
edge, an unsupervised data mining technique could be used to mine outliers in DB. For example, the distance-based outlier
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rameters k and R are set to k = 3 and R = √2 (which is the distance separating each point (x, y) of DB from its nearest
neighbor (x′, y′) in DB). According to these parameters, there are two outliers in DB, namely, (0,100) and (100,0). These
two points are precisely the two extremes of the distribution associated with points in DB.
Notice that, according to the distance-based deﬁnition, point (50,50) is the worst candidate to represent an outlier in DB,
since it is, in fact, the centermost point of DB. And indeed, for each combination of values for the parameter k and R , it
holds that the point (50,50) is a distance-based outlier in DB if and only if all the points in DB are distance-based outliers.
A similar situation would characterize the other methods surveyed above in this subsection.
Assume, conversely, that the domain knowledge informally stated above is available as encoded in a default theory
 = (D,W ) such that
W = DB∪ {s(x, y, x+ y) | x, y ∈ I}∪ {e(x, x) | x ∈ I}, and
D =
{¬s(x, y,100)∨ e(x, y) : ¬p(x, y)
¬p(x, y) | x, y ∈ I
}
∪
{ : ¬s(x, y, z)
¬s(x, y, z) | x, y, z ∈ I
}
,
where the ternary predicate s(x, y, z) represents the sum (s(x, y, z) is in W if z = x + y) and the binary predicate e(x, y)
represents the equality (e(x, y) is in W if x = y). By exploiting Deﬁnition 3.2, the abnormality perceived in the knowledge
encoded by theory  can be singled out. Indeed
(D,W {p(50,50)}) | ¬p(50,50), and
(D,W {p(50,50)},{e(50,50)}) 
| ¬p(50,50),
and the set S = {p(50,50)} is an outlier witness set for the outlier set L = {e(50,50)}. Loosely speaking, {e(50,50)} being
an outlier can be interpreted as the number 50 behaving abnormally, while {p(50,50)} being a witness can be interpreted
as the explanation of its abnormality, that is that the point (50,50) does not satisfy both conditions (a) and (b) but is,
nonetheless, included in the set of observations DB concerning the predicate p. 
Before concluding, we want to emphasize that the framework developed in this paper relies heavily on the concept of
default rules. The default rules describe what is normally expected, and hence can be exploited for detecting observations
which are not normal according to the default theory at hand. Such default rules are not given in advance in the frameworks
discussed in this section. Furthermore, along with outliers, we single out their “witnesses”—those unexpected properties that
characterize outliers. As far as we know, no such justiﬁcations for outliers are provided by the approaches described above.
6.3. Outlier detection using stable model semantics
We have originally presented outlier detection in the context of default logics [4]. Outlier detection was successively
studied in the context of non-disjunctive logic programs under stable model semantics in [5]. Next, we recall the notion of
stable model and the deﬁnition of outlier provided in [5].
A propositional logic program (LP, for short) is a collection of classical-negation-free non-disjunctive propositional rules.
Clearly, from a syntactic viewpoint, LPs form a subset of ELPs (precisely those consisting of all classical-negation-free ELPs).
The stable model semantics of a LP P assigns to P the set of its stable models SM(P ), that corresponds to the set of the
answer sets of P .
Let S be a set of propositional letters. Then, program P entails S (resp. ¬S), denoted by P | S (resp. P | ¬S), if for each
model M ∈ SM(P ) and for each letter L in S , L ∈ M (resp. L /∈ M).
So, loosely speaking, logic programs rely on the closed world assumption (CWA for short), which states that everything
which is not explicitly inferred is false. Extended logic programs, on the other hand, relay on open world assumption (OWA
for short), which states that only what can be explicitly inferred is true, while all the rest is unknown.
In the following, unless it is clear from the context, in order to differentiate the operator deﬁned on logic programs
(relying on the CWA) from the operator deﬁned on extended logic programs (relying, vice versa, on the OWA), we will
denote the former by |cwa and the latter by |owa.
A LP rule-observation pair P = (D,W ) is deﬁned in [5] analogously to an ELP rule-observation pair, but D is a logic
program and W is a set of letters (positive literals). Next, the deﬁnition of outlier in the context of logic programs under
stable model semantics is recalled.
Deﬁnition 6.8. (Given in [5].) Let P = (D,W ) be a LP rule-observations program, and let L ⊆ W be a set of literals. If there
exists a nonempty set of literals S ⊆ WL such that:
(i) P S |cwa ¬S , and
(ii) P S,L 
|cwa ¬S
then we say that L is an outlier set and S is an outlier witness set for L in P .
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programs under stable model semantics do not allow classical negation, but only negation as failure. As a consequence,
in [5], the negation of the witness is not required to be explicitly inferred but, rather, that the witness is not entailed by the
logic program. This is in contrast to the view adopted in the present paper, by which the witnessing set for an outlier is a
property that is explicitly observed and opposite to that which is expected. Hence, the approach of [5] singles out anomalies
of a different nature.
These differences can be substantiated from a formal point of view by showing that Deﬁnitions 3.2 and 6.8 cannot be
reduced one to the other by means of natural program transformations, which are usually employed in order to prove that
normal logic programs are semantically equivalent to extended logic programs6 [26]. Given an (extended) logic program-
observation pair P , we investigate two program transformations: the positive form P+ of P which, informally speaking, is
the LP representing the counterpart of P under the stable model semantics, and the two-valued form P− of P , formally
deﬁned next, which, loosely speaking, is the ELP representing the closed-world interpretation of P .
Deﬁnition 6.9. Let P = (D,W ) be an ELP rule-observation pair and let L be the set of the propositional letters occurring
in P . For each  ∈ L, let ¬ denote a novel propositional letter. Let L ∈ L be a positive literal  (resp., negative literal
¬), then by L+ we denote the propositional letter  (resp., the propositional letter ¬). Let S be a subset of L ∪ ¬L.
Then by S+ we denote the set {L+ | L ∈ S}. For each rule r = L1 ← L2, . . . , Lm,not Lm+1, . . . ,not Ln , let r+ denote the rule
L+1 ← L+2 , . . . , L+m,not L+m+1, . . . ,not L+n . The positive form P+ of P is the LP rule-observation pair P+ = (D+,W+) such that
D+ = {r+ | r ∈ D} ∪ {C ← , ¬ |  ∈ L} ∪ { ← C |  ∈ L} ∪ {¬ ← C |  ∈ L}, where C is a new letter. The last three sets are
introduced in order to assure that whenever a literal and its negation belong to an answer set, then the answer set is forced
to include all the literals appearing in the logic program.
By the results of [26], it holds that M is a consistent (resp., inconsistent) answer set for P if and only if M+ (M+ ∪ {C},
resp.) is a stable model for P+ .
The deﬁnition of a two-valued form of an extended logic program (ELP) follows.
Deﬁnition 6.10. Let P = (D,W ) be an ELP rule-observation pair and let L be the set of the propositional letters occurring
in P . The two-valued form P− of P is the ELP rule-observation pair P− = (D−,W−) such that D− = D∪{¬p ← not p | p ∈ L}
and W− = W .
Given an ELP (LP, resp.) rule-observation pair P , we denote by 	owa(P ) (	cwa(P ), resp.) the set of pairs (S, L) such that
L is an outlier set in P and S is an outlier witness set for L in P according to Deﬁnition 3.2 (6.8, resp.).
We show that the following three properties hold.
– OP1: Let P be an ELP rule-observation pair, (S, L) ∈ 	owa(P ) (S+, L+) ∈ 	cwa(P+) and (S+, L+) ∈ 	cwa(P+)
(S, L) ∈ 	owa(P ),
– OP2: Let P be an ELP rule-observation pair, (S, L) ∈ 	owa(P ) (S, L) ∈ 	owa(P−) and (S, L) ∈ 	owa(P−) (S, L) ∈
	owa(P ),
– OP3: Let P be a LP rule-observation pair, (S, L) ∈ 	cwa(P ) ⇔ (S, L) ∈ 	owa(P−).
OP1 states that the outliers according to Deﬁnition 3.2 in a generic ELP program-observation pair P are incomparable with
the outliers according to Deﬁnition 6.8 in the positive form P+ of P ; OP2 states that the outliers according to Deﬁnition 3.2
in a generic ELP program-observation pair P are incomparable with the outliers according to Deﬁnition 3.2 in the two-valued
form P− of P ; and, ﬁnally, OP3 states that Deﬁnition 3.2 can be used to single out the outliers in a LP rule-observation
pair P according to Deﬁnition 6.8, by means of the transformation P− .
It follows from these properties that the framework for mining outliers described here is more general than that de-
scribed in [5].
OP1, OP2 and OP3 are proved next.
Theorem 6.11 (OP1). Let P be an ELP rule-observation pair. Then (S, L) ∈ 	owa(P )  (S+, L+) ∈ 	cwa(P+) and (S+, L+) ∈
	cwa(P+) (S, L) ∈ 	owa(P ).
Next we prove the above statement by providing two counterexamples. Let us start with the ﬁrst implication. Consider
the ELP pair P̂ = (D,W ), where D includes the only rule
¬p ← not p,q.
6 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of comparison.
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p¬ ← not p,q. C ← p, p¬. C ← q,q¬. p ← C . p¬ ← C . q ← C . q¬ ← C .
and W+ is {p,q}. Consider the outlier L = {q} in P̂ with the associated witness S = {p}. It is clear that L+ and S+ do
not form an outlier-witness pair in P̂+ . Indeed, while P̂+{p} |cwa ¬p, since p does not belong to the unique stable model
M1 = {p¬,q} of P̂+{p} , the unique stable model M2 of the latter logic program is the empty set, and hence P̂+{p},{q} |cwa ¬p.
As for the second implication in OP1, consider the ELP pair P˜ = (D,W ), where D includes only the rule
p ← not q.
and W is the set {p,q}. Then P˜+ = (D+,W+) is such that D+ is
p ← not q. C ← p, p¬. C ← q,q¬. p ← C . p¬ ← C . q ← C . q¬ ← C .
and W+ is {p,q}. Consider the outlier L+ = {q} in P˜+ with the associated witness S+ = {p}. It is clear that L and S do not
form an outlier-witness pair in P . Indeed, P˜ {p} 
|owa ¬p, since the unique answer set of the ELP P˜ {p} is {q}.
Theorem 6.12 (OP2). Let P be an ELP rule-observation pair. Then (S, L) ∈ 	owa(P ) (S, L) ∈ 	owa(P−) and (S, L) ∈ 	owa(P−)
(S, L) ∈ 	owa(P ).
Next we prove the above statement by providing two counterexamples. Let us start with the ﬁrst implication in OP2.
Consider again the ELP pair P̂ of the preceding example, and the corresponding two-valued form P̂− = (D−,W−), where
D− is
¬p ← not p,q. ¬p ← not p. ¬q ← not q.
and W− is {p,q}. Consider the outlier L = {q} in P̂ with the associated witness S = {p}. Also in this case, L and S do not
form an outlier-witness pair in P̂− . Indeed, while P̂−{p} |owa ¬p, the ELP P̂−{p},{q} has the unique answer set {¬p,¬q}, and
hence P̂−{p},{q} |owa ¬p.
As for the second implication in OP2, consider again the ELP pair P˜ of the preceding example, and the corresponding
two-valued form P˜− = (D−,W−), where D− is
p ← not q. ¬p ← not p. ¬q ← not q.
and W− is {p,q}. Consider the outlier L = {q} in P˜− with the associated witness S = {p}. Then L and S do not form an
outlier-witness pair in P˜ . Indeed, the unique answer set of P˜ {p} is {q} and hence P˜ {p} 
|owa ¬p.
Next we provide an intuition as to why those implications cited in Theorems 6.11 and 6.13 actually fail to hold.
As for the positive form transformation (see Theorem 6.11), consider condition (ii) of Deﬁnition 3.2:
P S,L 
|owa ¬S ≡
(∃M ∈ ANSW(P S,L))(∃s ∈ S)(¬s /∈ M).
Following results from [26] and assuming consistency, condition (ii) of Deﬁnition 6.8 can be formulated as:
P+S+,L+ 
|cwa ¬S+ ≡
(∃M ∈ ANSW(P S,L))(∃s ∈ S+)(s ∈ M+).
Clearly, the ﬁrst condition does not imply in general the second one since it might exist an answer set M such that both ¬s
and s do not occur in M . Consequently, (S, L) ∈ 	owa(P ) (S+, L+) ∈ 	cwa(P+). For the inverse implication a similar line
of reasoning can be followed.
As for the two-valued form transformation (see Theorem 6.13), consider again condition (ii) of Deﬁnition 3.2. Clearly,
this condition does not exclude that there exists an answer set M such that s /∈ M . Therefore, since in the program P−
there is the rule ¬s ← not s, it might be the case that M is associated with an answer set M− of P− such that ¬s ∈ M− .
Consequently (S, L) ∈ 	owa(P ) (S, L) ∈ 	owa(P−). For the inverse implication a similar line of reasoning can be drawn.
Conversely, a faithful correspondence holds for 	cwa(P ) and 	owa(P−), as shown next.
Theorem 6.13 (OP3). Let P be a LP rule-observation pair. Then (S, L) ∈ 	cwa(P ) ⇔ (S, L) ∈ 	owa(P−).
Proof. It is well known that if M is a stable model of a LP P , then
M− = M ∪ {¬ |  ∈ (L \ M)},
where L is the set of all the propositional letters occurring in P , is an answer set of P− [26]. Moreover, every answer set
of P− can be represented in the form shown above, where M is a stable model of P . Thus,
P S |cwa ¬S ⇔
(∀M ∈ SM(P S ))(s /∈ M) ⇔ (∀M− ∈ ANSW(P−S ))(¬s ∈ M−) ⇔ P−S |owa ¬S, and
P S,L 
|cwa ¬S ⇔
(∃M ∈ SM(P S,L))(s ∈ M) ⇔ (∃M− ∈ ANSW(P−S,L))(¬s /∈ M−) ⇔ P−S,L 
|owa ¬S.
This completes the proof. 
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q ←m,not e.
and W is {q,m, e}. The ELP program P− = (D−,W−) is such that D− is
q ←m,not e. ¬q ← not q. ¬m ← not m. ¬e ← not e.
and W− is {p,m, e}. Consider the outlier L = {e} in P with the associated witness set {q}. L and P form an outlier-witness
pair also in P− . Indeed it can be veriﬁed that P−{q} |owa ¬q, due to the rule ¬q ← not q, and also that P−{q},{e} 
|owa ¬q,
since q belongs to the unique answer set of this program and consequently ¬q does not belong to it.
The following example helps in further clarifying the dissimilarities between the two frameworks. Consider a railroad
crossing scenario, and assume that the current state of the world viewed by Agent A is modeled by the proposition red_light,
which represents the knowledge that the semaphore located near the railroad is red, and cross(B), representing the knowl-
edge that Agent B is passing through the railroad track. The knowledge base of Agent A supposedly has a rule asserting
that normally the railroad should not be crossed when the light is red. Let us consider two formalisms for representing the
knowledge base. First, assume that the knowledge of Agent A is encoded in a default theory, consisting of the single default
rule red_light:¬cross(x)¬cross(x) (or, equivalently, by the ELP rule under the answer set semantics ¬cross(x) ← not cross(x), red_light).
Equipped with this knowledge, Agent A might conclude that something is wrong, since {cross(B)} is a witness for the
outlier {red_light}, in that removing cross(B) from the current state of the world explicitly derives the exact opposite, i.e.
¬cross(B), while removing both cross(B) and red_light does not entail ¬cross(B). To conclude it is worth pointing out that
the rule ¬cross(x) ← not cross(x), red_light plays the role of program P̂ introduced in one of the counterexamples used to
prove Theorem 6.11.
Second, assume that instead of being encoded in default logic, the knowledge of Agent A is encoded in a logic program
under stable model semantics. In this case, Agent A must rely on a kind of knowledge which is somewhat different and
weaker than the knowledge encoded by the default rule above. Indeed, since there is no explicit negation in this formalism,
a logic programming rule like cross(x) ← not red_light may be used. This rule models the somewhat hazardous decision:
“if it is unknown that the semaphore light is red, then the railroad can be crossed”. According to the work of [5], in this
situation we will also conclude that red_light is an outlier and cross(B) is its witness. This is because after removing cross(B)
from the current state of the world, cross(B) can no longer be explicitly inferred, and, consequently, ¬cross(B) is entailed,
while after removing both cross(B) and red_light, cross(B) is explicitly inferred, and, consequently, ¬cross(B) is not entailed.
Again, it is worth noticing the connection to the theorems proved above: in this case, the rule cross(x) ← not red_light plays
the role of program P˜ introduced in one of the counterexamples used to prove Theorem 6.11.
This example demonstrates basic differences with the formalism adopted by [5]. Indeed, in the previous example, the de-
fault rule red_light:¬cross(x)¬cross(x) (or, equivalently, by the ELP rule under the answer set semantics ¬cross(x) ← not cross(x), red_light)
captures the knowledge that normally the railroad should not be crossed when the light is red (unless, for example, there
is some state of emergency). One could claim that the rule we used under stable model semantics does not faithfully corre-
spond to the default, since the rule states under which conditions one should cross, instead of saying, as done in the default,
when one should not cross. The problem is that there is no natural way of saying anything similar in the language of normal
logic programs under stable model semantics because this language has no classical negation and, by the previous theorem,
classical negation cannot be faithfully simulated. To illustrate the other way around, note that with outlier detection under
stable model semantics of [5] all observations are encoded as positive literals. Now consider one such example where we
look for outliers under stable model semantics. If we were to construct a perfectly corresponding example under default
reasoning, with the same outliers and witnesses to be exactly there, then the involved default rules should have strong
negated literals as consequences according to Deﬁnition 3.2, but such consequences cannot be directly coded under stable
model semantics, since strong negation is not allowed.
It is also worth pointing out that complexity pictures derived for the fragment of non-disjunctive logic programs under
stable model semantics cannot be exploited to derive complexity results concerning disjunctive logic programs under answer
set semantics, since the latter are more general. And, in fact, outlier detection using EDLPs is more complex than outlier
detection when disjunction-free logic programs under stable model semantics are considered. For instance, while it has
been shown in previous sections that the outlier existence problem is 	P3-complete in the former case, the same problem
is 	P2-complete in the latter case (see [5]).
7. Conclusion
Suppose you are walking down the street and you see a blind person going in the opposite direction. You believe he is
blind because he is feeling his way with a walking stick. Suddenly something falls out of his bag and to your surprise, he
ﬁnds it immediately without probing about with his ﬁngers, as one would expect from a blind person. This kind of behavior
renders that person to be blind a suspicious situation.
In this paper we provided a formal framework for this type of commonsense reasoning. Our framework is essentially a
data mining technique as it allows for automatic discovery of outliers. The user of a system built using our outlier detection
method does not have to specify the suspicious observations or provide a list of potential outliers. Rather, the system
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method can be used in several applications such as diagnosis and homeland security.
We used two related logics for our formal analysis: Reiter’s default logic and extended disjunctive logic programming
under the answer set semantics. Reiter’s default logic was chosen because it constitutes a powerful nonmonotonic formalism
that deals with incomplete information, while logic programming was chosen for its practicality. Logic programming as a
tool of KR&R is widely employed in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, and some eﬃcient implemented systems are available [38,40,43].
We addressed several main issues related to this idea of outlier detection in the framework of default logics and ex-
tended disjunctive logic programs under the answer set semantics. First, we introduced a formal deﬁnition of outliers and
justiﬁed it using several application examples. Second, we analyzed the complexities involved in incorporating the outlier
detection mechanism into knowledge bases expressed using default logic or extended logic programs. In our view, a thor-
ough complexity analysis is essential for singling out the more complex subtasks involved in outlier detection. This ﬁrst step
is conducive to designing effective algorithms for implementation purposes. We have also provided an extensive comparison
between our formalism and other methods that exist in the literature for outlier detection.
Our approach relies on the existence of default rules in the knowledge base. Hence methods to automatically create
defaults are of interest for the application of our technique. For instance, the techniques developed by Nicholas and Duval
[20,42], allow for learning default theories from examples. In Section 3.3 we demonstrated an example of outlier detection
in the context of learned default theories. Other techniques for learning rules deserve attention, and coupling our method
with these techniques could be an interesting topic for future research. Among these other techniques, inductive logic
programming deals with learning (variants of) logic programs in various settings [36]. For instance, Inoue and Kudoh [29]
worked on learning extended logic programs. Learning rules can also be realized in semi-supervised settings using an
approach like metaquerying [3,13].
This work can be extended in several directions. First, the concept of outliers in other frameworks of default reason-
ing, like System Z [46], and Circumscription [41] should be studied. Second, intelligent heuristics that will enable the
heavy computational task involved in eﬃcient outlier detection should be investigated. In this respect, the identiﬁcation
of tractable subsets for the task of outlier detection might be one possible step towards making the computation task more
eﬃcient. Third, the ideas developed here might be exploited for using default logic for specifying semantically rich integrity
constraints on relational databases such that any tuple that does not comply with the constraints will be an outlier (cf.
Section 3.3).
Private and public organizations are overwhelmed with vast quantities of data and knowledge. Procedures that eﬃciently
analyze the data and report only essential information are in great need. Our framework is one such knowledge discovery
procedure as it is capable of identifying abnormal properties and abnormal observations automatically. It remains to ﬁnd out
how the ideas developed in this paper will work in practice. To this end, we hope to develop a system for outlier detection
and test it on real-world data.
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Appendix A. Proofs for Section 4
The following notations are used in this sequel.
Let L be a set of literals. Then we denote by L+ the set of positive literals occurring in L, and with L− the set of negative
literals occurring in L.
Let T be a truth assignment to the set x1, . . . , xn of variables. Then Lit(T ) denotes the set of literals {1, . . . , n}, such
that i is xi if T (xi) = true and is ¬xi if T (xi) = false, for i = 1, . . . ,n.
Let T1 and T2 be two truth assignments on the disjoint sets X and Y of variables, respectively. Then T1 ∪ T2 denotes the
truth assignment T on the set of variables X ∪ Y such that T (x) = T1(x), if x ∈ X , and T (x) = T2(x), if x ∈ Y .
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Outlier on propositional default theories is
1. 	P3-complete, for general theories, and
2. 	P2-complete, for DF theories.
Proof. 1. (Membership) Given a theory  = (D,W ), we must show that there exist two disjoint subsets L and S =
{s1, . . . , sn} of W such that (D,WS ) | ¬s1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬sn (problem q′) and (D,WS,l) 
| ¬s1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬sn (problem q′′). Prob-
lem q′ is 
P-complete, while problem q′′ is 	P-complete [27,54]. Thus, a polynomial-time nondeterministic Turing machine2 2
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solves problems q′ and q′′ by two calls to the oracle.
(Hardness) To prove the completeness of the query Outlier, the 	P3-complete problem of deciding the validity of a
QBE3,∃ formula is reduced to it. A QBE3,∃ formula  has the form
∃X∀Y∃Z f (X, Y , Z)
where X, Y , Z are disjoint sets of variables, and f (X, Y , Z) is a propositional formula on X, Y , Z . Intuitively, the reduction
associates the default theory () = (D(),W ()) with the formula  so that:
– there exists one and only one literal l in W () that may belong to an outlier set, but not to any witness set;
– there exists a bijection between each of the possible outlier witness sets S from W () and all the potential truth
assignments of the variables in the set X ;
– S() = (D(),W ()S ) encodes  so that S () | ¬S iff ∀Y∃Z f (X, Y , Z) is valid, subject to the truth assignment
of X induced by S;
– {l} acts as a switch, that is, if removed from W ()S then (D(),W ()S,{l}) 
| ¬S for each outlier witness set S .
More formally, let  = ∃X∀Y∃Z f (X, Y , Z) be a quantiﬁed Boolean formula, where X = x1, . . . , xn , Y = y1, . . . , ym , and Z are
disjoint set of variables. With , the default theory () = (D(),W ()) is associated, where W () is the set of literals
{l,¬φ, x1, . . . , xn}, and D() = D1 ∪ D2 ∪ D3 ∪ D4, where:
D1 =
{
δ1,1,i = xi : x
′
i
x′i
, δ1,2,i = : ¬xi¬xi , δ1,3,i =
¬φ : xi
xi
, δ1,2,4 = ¬xi : x
′
i
x′i
| i = 1, . . . ,n
}
,
D2 =
{
δ2,1 = : φ
φ
, δ2,2 = : ¬l¬l , δ2,3 =
¬l : ¬φ
¬φ
}
,
D3 =
{
δ3,1, j = : y j
y j
, δ3,2, j = : ¬y j¬y j | j = 1, . . . ,m
}
,
D4 =
{
δ4 = x
′
1 ∧ · · · ∧ x′n ∧¬ f (X, Y , Z) : ¬φ
¬φ
}
and X ′ = x′1, . . . , x′n are new letters. Occurrences of these letters can be removed from the defaults in D() without affecting
the correctness of the reduction. However, their use makes the reduction easier to understand. Clearly, () can be built
in polynomial time. Now it is shown that  is valid iff there exists an outlier in ().
First of all, we note that each extension E of the default theory (D(),W ()S ), where S is an arbitrary subset of W (),
is the logical closure of a maximal consistent subset of the set U = (X ∪ X ′ ∪ Y ∪ Y ′ ∪ {l, φ})∪¬(X ∪ Y ∪ {l, φ}).
Claims 1–3 below take into account the role of the defaults belonging to the set D() deﬁned above.
Claim 1. Let S be a subset of W (), and ′ = (D(),W ()S ). Then l ∈ S implies that ′ 
| ¬s for each s ∈ W () \ {l}.
Proof of Claim 1. Assume that l ∈ S . Then, by applying rules δ2,2 and δ2,3, there exists an extension E of ′ such that
¬φ ∈ E . Consequently, for each xi ∈ S , by defaults δ1,3,i (1 i  n), there exists an extension Ei of ′ such that xi ∈ Ei . 
Claim 2. Let S ⊆ W () be an outlier witness for an outlier set L ⊆ W () in (). Then {¬φ} ⊆ S ⊆ W () \ {l}.
Proof of Claim 2. Let ′ be the theory (D(),W ()S ) and let ′′ be the theory (D(),W ()S,L). Suppose that l ∈ S . From
Claim 1, l ∈ S implies that ′ 
| ¬s, for each s ∈ W () \ {l}. Hence, we can conclude that l ∈ S implies that S = {l}. But,
because of rule δ2,3 and as there does not exist a rule in D() having l as its consequence, both ′ | ¬l and ′′ | ¬l, no
matter what the value of L is. Thus, {l} cannot be an outlier witness for any set in W (), and S ⊆ W () \ {l}.
Suppose now that ¬φ does not belong to S , i.e., that S ⊆ {x1, . . . , xn}. Since the literal ¬φ belongs to W ()S , there exists
an extension E of ′ such that E ⊇ {x1, . . . , xn} which is obtained by applying defaults δ1,3,i (1  i  n), and S is not an
outlier witness set, a contradiction. 
Claim 3. Let T X be a truth assignment on the set X of variables and let S = {xi ∈ X | T X (xi) = false} ∪ {¬φ}. Then, for each
extension E of (D(),W ()S ), it holds that E ⊃ Lit(T X ).
Proof of Claim 3. Assume that there exists an extension E of (D(),W ()S ) such that E 
⊇ Lit(T X ). Then it is the case
that there exists a letter xi , which is false according to T X , such that xi ∈ E . Since xi ∈ S , it is the case that rule δ1,3,i is a
generating default of E (while rule δ1,2,i is not). Notice now that the precondition of rule δ1,3,i is ¬φ. As ¬φ ∈ S , it is the
case that rule δ4 is also a generating default of E applied before rule δ1,3,i . Since rule δ4 has the letter x′ in its precondition,i
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generating default of E , or, equivalently, xi /∈ E , a contradiction. 
We now continue with the main proof.
(⇒) Suppose that  is valid. Then there exists a truth assignment T X on the set X of variables such that T X satisﬁes
∀Y∃Z f (X, Y , Z). Let S = {xi ∈ X | T X (xi) = false} ∪ {¬φ}. We will show that S is an outlier witness for {l} in ().
For each truth assignment TY on the set of variables Y , consider the subset EY of the extensions of (D(),W ()S )
consisting of the extensions EY such that EY ⊃ Lit(TY ). In particular, by Claim 3, each EY is such that EY ⊃ Lit(T X )∪ Lit(TY ).
Since  is valid, it is the case that there exists a truth assignment T Z to the set of variables Z such that T X ∪ TY ∪ T Z
satisﬁes f (X, Y , Z). Hence, for each EY ∈ EY , it holds that ¬ f (X, Y , Z) /∈ EY , and the rule δ4 cannot be a generating default
of the extension EY . To conclude, the sets EY induce a partition of the set of all extensions of (D(),W ()S ), and hence
(D(),W ()S ) | ¬S .
(⇐) Suppose that there exists an outlier set L in (). Then there exists a nonempty set of literals S such that S is an
outlier witness set for L in () and, from Claim 2, such that {¬φ} ⊆ S ⊆ W () \ {l}.
Let T X be the truth assignment to the set of variables X such that T X (xi) = false, if xi ∈ S , and T X (xi) = true, if xi /∈ S .
Then, by Claim 3, for each extension E of (D(),W ()S ), it holds that E ⊇ Lit(T X ). Now it is shown that T X satisﬁes
∀Y∃Z f (X, Y , Z), i.e., that  is valid. For each truth assignment TY to the set of variables Y , there exists a subset EY
of the extensions of (D(),W ()S ) that is the set of all the extensions EY such that EY ⊃ Lit(TY ). We also recall that
EY ⊃ Lit(T X ).
Thus, in order for L to be an outlier in (), it must be the case that, for each set of literals Lit(TY ); for each set of
extensions EY ; and for each extension EY ∈ EY , it holds that φ ∈ EY . By defaults δ2,1 and δ4, φ ∈ EY if and only if ¬φ /∈ EY
if and only if δ4 is not a generating default of EY if and only if there exists a truth assignment to the set of variables Z such
that T X ∪ TY ∪ T Z satisﬁes f (X, Y , Z). As the sets of extensions EY form a partition of the extensions of (D(),W ()S ),
we can conclude that  is valid.
As for the outlier set L, note that S is always an outlier witness set for L = {l} in (). Indeed, consider the theory
′′ = (D(),W ()S,{l}). It follows from Claim 1 that ′′ 
| ¬S .
2. (Membership) Analogous to Point 1 of Theorem 4.1, the only difference being that an NP oracle is used in place of a
	P2 oracle.
(Hardness) Let  = ∃X∀Y f (X, Y ) be a quantiﬁed Boolean formula in disjunctive normal form, where X = x1, . . . , xn and
Y = y1, . . . , ym are disjoint set of variables, and f (X, Y ) = D1 ∨ · · · ∨ Dr , with Dk = tk,1 ∧ tk,2 ∧ tk,3, and each tk,1, tk,2, tk,3
is a literal on the set X ∪ Y (k = 1, . . . , r). The default theory () = (D(),W ()) is associated with , where W () =
{l,¬φ, x1, . . . , xn} is a set of letters, with l and φ being new letters that are distinct from those occurring in , and D() =
D1 ∪ D2 ∪ D3 ∪ D4 is identical to the set of defaults reported in point 1 of Theorem 4.1 except for set D4 which is:
D4 =
{
δ4,h,k = x
′
1 ∧ · · · ∧ x′n ∧¬tk,h : ¬dk
¬dk | k = 1, . . . , r; h = 1,2,3
}
∪
{
δ4 = ¬d1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬dr : ¬φ¬φ
}
where d1, . . . ,dr are new letters that are distinct from those occurring in . Clearly, () can be built in polynomial time.
By exactly following the same line of reasoning as in Theorem 4.1 Point 1, it can be shown that  is valid iff there exists
an outlier in (). 
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Outlier(L) on propositional default theories is
1. 	P3-complete, for general theories, and
2. 	P2-complete, for DF theories.
Proof.
1. (Membership) The proof is analogous to that used in Point 1 of Theorem 4.1.
(Hardness) The reduction is the same as that in Point 1 of Theorem 4.1. Clearly,  is valid iff {l} is an outlier set
for ().
2. The proof is analogous to that used in Point 2 of Theorem 4.1. 
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Outlier(S) on propositional default theories is
1. DP2-complete, for general theories, and
2. DP-complete, for DF theories.
Proof. 1. (Membership) See Section 4.2.
(Hardness) Let 1 = (D1,W1) and 2 = (D2,W2) be two normal propositional default theories, let s1, s2 be two letters,
and let q be the problem ((1 | s1)∧ (2 
| s2)). W.l.o.g, it can be assumed that 1 and 2 contain different letters.
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P2-complete even
in the case in which W is empty. Thus, in the following we assume that both W1 and W2 are empty sets.
Problem q is associated with the default theory (q) = (D(q),W (q)) which is deﬁned as follows. Let D(q) = { s2∧α:β
β
|
α:β
β
∈ D1} ∪ D2, and W (q) = {¬s1, s2}. We will show that q is true iff {¬s1} is a witness for some outlier in (q). Note that
q is the conjunction of a 
P2-hard and a 	
P
2-hard problem, which proves D
P
2-hardness.
(⇒) Suppose that q is true. We will show that {¬s1} is an outlier witness for {s2} in (q). Consider the theory ′ =
(D(q),W (q){¬s1}). First, we note that ′ | s1. Indeed, from 1 | s1 and s2 ∈ W (q){¬s1} , it can be concluded that ′ | s1
by means of defaults coming from the set D1.
Consider now the theory ′′ = (D(q),W (q){¬s1},{s2}). As 2 
| s2, there exists an extension E of ′′ such that s2 does not
belong to E , and its associated set DE of generating defaults does not contain any rule from the set of defaults D(q) \ D2.
We also note that ′′ is consistent, as both 1 and 2 are consistent. Thus it can be concluded that ′′ 
| s1. Hence, {¬s1}
is an outlier witness for {s2} in (q).
(⇐) Suppose that {¬s1} is a witness for some outlier set L in (q). Let ′ and ′′ denote the theories (D(q),W (q){¬s1})
and (D(q),W (q){¬s1},L) respectively.
First, we note that ′ | s1. As the literal s1 occurs only in the rules of D(q) coming from D1, and the rules in D2 have
no letters in common with these rules, except for letter s2, and s2 ∈ W (q){¬s1} , then it is the case that 1 | s1.
In order for ′′ 
| s1 to hold, L must include the letter s2. Since W (q) = {¬s1, s2}, L must be equal to {s2}. Clearly, it
must also be the case that ′′ 
| s2, i.e., that 2 
| s2. This proves that the problem q is indeed veriﬁed.
2. Both membership and hardness are analogous to Point 1 of Theorem 4.4. 
Proof of Theorem 4.6. Outlier(S)(L) on propositional default theories is
1. DP2-complete, for general theories, and
2. DP-complete, for DF theories.
Proof. The membership proof is identical to that of Theorem 4.4. The hardness proof is identical to that of Theorem 4.4,
but with a minor addendum. Indeed, while in the problem considered in Theorem 4.4, the outlier set L is unknown and the
outlier witness set S is part of the input, in the problem considered here both the outlier set L and the witness set S are
part of the input. Note that the reduction employed in Theorem 4.4 outputs a default theory (q) = (D(q),W (q)) (we refer
to that theorem for the form of the formula q), with W (q) = {s1,¬s2}, such that S = {¬s1} is a witness set in (q) if and
only if q is valid. It can be inferred also that S is a witness set if and only if L = {s2} is an outlier set. Thus, to conclude the
hardness proof, it is suﬃcient to include the sets L = {s2} and S = {¬s1} together with the theory (q) as part of the input
for the problem Outlier(S)(L). 
Proof of Theorem 4.7. Outlier-min(L) on general propositional default theories is
1. DP3-complete, for general theories, and
2. DP2-complete, for DF theories.
Proof. 1. (Membership) Given a default theory  = (D,W ) and a set of literals L ⊆ W , we must show (i) that L is an
outlier in , i.e., that there exists a set S ⊆ WL such that (D,WS ) | ¬S and (D,WS,L) 
| ¬S (query q′), and (ii) that L is a
minimal outlier, i.e., that for each nonempty subset L′ ⊂ L, L′ is not an outlier in , i.e., that for each subset S ′ ⊂ (W \ L′),
(((D,WS ′ ) 
| ¬S ′)∨ ((D,WS ′,L′) | ¬S ′)) holds (query q′′).
Query q′ can be solved by a polynomial time nondeterministic Turing machine with a 	P2 oracle that guesses the set S
and then calls the oracle twice to decide ((D,WS ) | ¬S) ∧ ((D,WS,L) 
| ¬S), and hence it is in 	P3 . Furthermore, the
negation of query q′′ can be decided by a polynomial time nondeterministic Turing machine with a 	P2 oracle, that guesses
the two sets L′ and S ′ and then calls the oracle two times to decide whether Q holds, and hence it is in 
P3. Summarizing,
the problem is the conjunction of two independent problems, one from 	P3 and the other from 

P
3, which implies that the
problem is in DP3.
(Hardness) Completeness of query Outlier-min(L) for general theories can be proved by reducing the problem of decid-
ing the validity of the formula
F = ((∃X)(∀Y )(∃Z) f (X, Y , Z))∧ ((∀W )(∃U )(∀V )g(W ,U , V ))
to the problem Outlier-min(L), where f (X, Y , Z) is a Boolean formula in conjunctive normal form and g(X, Y , Z) is a
Boolean formula in disjunctive normal form. Formula F is the conjunction of a QBE3,∃ and a QBE3,∀ formula, a complete
problem for the class DP3. A similar reduction, but considering the conjunction of a QBE2,∃ formula and a QBE2,∀ formula,
can be used to prove the result for DF default theories. In particular, the default theory (D(F ),W (F )) is associated to the
formula F such that:
F. Angiulli et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 172 (2008) 1837–1872 1865(a) the outlier set L precisely consists of two literals, that is L = {l1, l2};
(b) W (F )L is partitioned into two subsets S X and SW such that, for each subset S of W (F )L , there exists a bijection
between the sets S ∩ S X and S ∩ SW and each possible truth assignment for the variables X and W , respectively;
(c) D(F ) is such that
– (D(F ),W (F )S ) | ¬(S ∩ S X ), and
– (D(F ),W (F )S,{l1}) | ¬(S ∩ S X ), and
– (D(F ),W (F )S,{l2}) | ¬(S ∩ S X ), and
– (D(F ),W (F )S,{l1,l2}) 
| ¬(S ∩ S X )
iff (∀Y )(∃Z) f (X, Y , Z) holds true subject to the truth assignment for the variables in the set X induced by S ∩ S X ;
(d) D(F ) is such that
– (D(F ),W (F )S ) | ¬(S ∩ SW ), and
– (D(F ),W (F )S,{l1}) 
| ¬(S ∩ SW ), and
– (D(F ),W (F )S,{l2}) 
| ¬(S ∩ SW )
iff (∀U )(∃V )¬g(X, Y , Z) holds true subject to the truth assignment for the variables in the set W induced by S ∩ SW .
It follows from point (d) above that, in order for {l1, l2} to be a minimal outlier set, then it is the case that there does
not exist a truth assignment to the variables of the set W such that (∀U )(∃V )¬g(X, Y , Z) is true, that is, that the formula
(∀W )(∃U )(∀V )g(W ,U , V ) is true. As a consequence, a witness S for L must be such that S ⊆ S X and, from point 3 above,
S encodes a truth assignment for the variables of the set X such that (∀Y )(∃Z) f (X, Y , Z) is true. Note that by point (c)
above, a subset S of S X represents a witness for neither {l1} nor {l2}, and this ﬁnally proves that L is a minimal outlier set
in (D(F ),W (F )) iff the formula F is true.
We now proceed to the detailed proof. Let  = ∃X∀Y∃Z f (X, Y , Z) and  = ∀W ∃U∀V g(W ,U , V ) be two quantiﬁed
Boolean formulas, where X = x1, . . . , xn , Y = y1, . . . , ym , Z , W = w1, . . . ,wp , U = u1, . . . ,uq , and V are disjoint set of
variables. Let F be the formula ∧ .
The normal default theory (F ) = (D(F ),W (F )) is associated With F , where W (F ) is the set of letters {l1, l2,¬φ, x1, . . . ,
xn,ψ,w1, . . . ,wp} where l1, l2, φ, and ψ are new letters distinct from those occurring in F , and D(F ) is D1 ∪ · · · ∪ D8,
where:
D1 =
{
xi : x′i
x′i
,
: ¬xi
¬xi ,
¬xi : x′i
x′i
,
¬φ : xi
xi
| i = 1, . . . ,n
}
,
D2 =
{ : y j
y j
,
: ¬y j
¬y j | j = 1, . . . ,m
}
,
D3 =
{
l1 ∧ x′1 ∧ · · · ∧ x′n ∧¬ f (X, Y , Z) : ¬φ
¬φ ,
l2 ∧ x′1 ∧ · · · ∧ x′n ∧¬ f (X, Y , Z) : ¬φ
¬φ
}
,
D4 =
{
l1 : φ
φ
,
l2 : φ
φ
}
,
D5 =
{
wk : w ′k
w ′k
,
: ¬wk
¬wk ,
¬wk : w ′k
w ′k
,
ψ : wk
wk
| k = 1, . . . , p
}
,
D6 =
{ : uh
uh
,
: ¬uh
¬uh | h = 1, . . . ,q
}
,
D7 =
{
l1 ∧ l2 ∧ w ′1 ∧ · · · ∧ w ′p ∧ g(W ,U , V ) : ψ
ψ
}
,
D8 =
{
l1 ∧ l2 : ¬ψ
¬ψ
}
.
Clearly W (F ) is consistent and (F ) can be built in polynomial time. Now it is shown that F is valid iff {l1, l2} is a minimal
outlier set in (F ).
(⇒) Suppose that F is valid. We will show that {l1, l2} is a minimal outlier in (F ).
Since F is valid, there exists a truth assignment T X to the variables in the set X such that T X satisﬁes ∀Y∃Z f (X, Y , Z).
Let S = {¬φ} ∪ {xi | T X (xi) = false}. We will show that S is a witness for the outlier set {l0, l1}. First note that, by rules in
the set D1, each extension E of (D(F ),W (F )S ) is such that xi ∈ E (¬xi ∈ E resp.) if xi is true (false resp.) according to T X .
Furthermore, by rules in the set D2, each extension E of (D(F ),W (F )S ) can be associated with a truth assignment TY to
the set Y of variables. In order for the literal ¬φ to belong to some extension of the theory (D(F ),W (F )S ), it must be the
case that, by the rules in the set D3, there exists a truth assignment TY to the set Y of variables such that (∀Z)¬ f (X, Y , Z)
is true subject to the truth assignment T X ∪ TY , or, equivalently, that the formula ¬(∀Y )(∃Z) f (X, Y , Z) is true subject to the
truth assignment T X , and that contradicts the deﬁnition of T X . It follows then that ¬φ does not belong to every extension
of (D(F ),W (F )S ). By the rules in the sets D1 and D4, we can conclude that the negation of the variables in the set S is
entailed by the default theory (D(F ),W (F )S ).
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set D4 are removed from W (F ) and do not appear in the conclusion of any default rule in (F ). Thus, {l1, l2} is an outlier
set in (F ).
Next, it is shown that {l1, l2} is a minimal outlier set in (F ), that is that neither {l1} nor {l2} are witness sets in (F ).
First of all, note that neither l1 nor l2 can belong to a witness set (recall that both ¬l1 and ¬l2 do not appear in the
consequence of any rule in D(F )). Furthermore, for each subset S of W (F ), let S ′ denote the set S ∩ {¬φ, x1, . . . , xn} and S ′′
denote the set S ∩ {ψ,w1, . . . ,wp}. Note that if S ′′ = ∅ then S = S ′ ⊆ {¬φ, x1, . . . , xn} cannot be a witness set for {l1} ({l2}
resp.). Indeed, as shown above, in order for (D(F ),W (F )S ′ ) | ¬S ′ to hold, it is the case that S ′ encodes a truth assignment
to the variables in the set X and, consequently, that φ belongs to every extension of the default theory (D(F ),W (F )S ′ ).
Nevertheless, in this scenario, the default theory (D(F ),W (F )S ′,{l1}) ((D(F ),W (F )S ′,{l2}) resp.) will continue to entail φ due
to rules belonging to the set D4.
It can be concluded that if {l1} ({l2} resp.) is an outlier set in (F ), then its associated witness set S must be such that
S ′′ = S ∩ {ψ,w1, . . . ,wp} is not empty. Note that ψ must belong to S ′′ , for otherwise S does not encode a witness by rules
ψ :wk
wk
(1  k  p) in the set D5. Now, for the sake of contradiction assume that {l1} ({l2} resp.) is an outlier set in (F ).
Notice that by rules in the set D5, for each extension E of (D(F ),W (F )S ), wk ∈ E (¬wk ∈ E resp.) if s′k /∈ S ′′ (s′k ∈ S ′′
resp.). Hence, the set S ′′ encodes a truth assignment to the variables in the set W . Furthermore, by the rules in the set D6,
each extension E of (D(F ),W (F )S ) can be associated with a truth assignment TU to the variables in the set U . Since {l1}
({l2} resp.) is an outlier set, then the default theory (D(F ),W (F )S ) entails ¬S ′′ , and ¬ψ belongs to every extension E of
(D(F ),W (F )S ). By rules in the sets D7, it can be concluded that, for each truth assignment TU to the set of variables U ,
there exists a truth variable assignment to the set of variables V which makes the formula g(W ,U , V ) false, for otherwise
the literal ψ belongs to at least one extension of the default theory (D(F ),W (F )S ). It can be concluded that there exists
a truth assignment TW to the set of variables W such that (∀U )(∃V )¬g(W ,U , V ) is true, that is, that ¬ is valid, which
contradicts the fact that F = ∧ is valid. Hence, we can conclude that neither {l1} nor {l2} are outlier sets in (F ). Thus,
{l1, l2} is a minimal outlier set in (F ).
(⇐) Suppose that {l1, l2} is a minimal outlier in (F ). Since {l1, l2} is an outlier set, there exists a subset S of
{¬φ, x1, . . . , xn,ψ,w1, . . . ,wp} such that (D(F ),W (F )S ) | ¬S . Let S ′ = S ∩ {¬φ, x1, . . . , xn}. Assume by contradiction that
there exists a nonempty subset S ′′ of {ψ,w1, . . . ,wp} such that S = S ′ ∪ S ′′ is a witness set for {l1, l2}. The set S ′′ must
contain the literal ψ , by rules ψ :wkwk (1  k  p) in the set D5. In order for (D(F ),W (F )S ) | ¬S ′′ to hold, it must be the
case that ¬ψ is entailed by the default theory (D(F ),W (F )S ). Since ¬ψ is entailed only by the rule in the set D8, it can
be concluded that both {l1} and {l2} are outlier sets in (F ), having the associated witness set S ′′ , which contradicts the
fact that {l1, l2} is a minimal outlier set. Hence, the set S ′′ must be empty.
As already observed in the previous point, rules in the set D5 associate with each subset S ′′ a truth assignment TW
to the set of variables W and rules in the set D6 associate with each extension of (D(F ),W (F )S ) a truth assignment
to the variables in the set U , while rules in the set D7 evaluate whether TW implies ∀U∃V¬g(W ,U , V ) or not. Hence,
from the fact that S ′′ must be an empty set, it can also be concluded that there is no truth assignment TW such that
∀U∃V¬g(W ,U , V ), i.e. that  = ∀W ∃U∀V g(W ,U , V ) is valid.
Since S ′′ is empty, it is the case that S = S ′ ⊆ {s0, . . . , sn}. In order for S to be a witness set, it must be the case that
for each extension E of (D(F ),W (F )S ′ ), ¬S ′ ∈ E holds and, hence, that φ ∈ E . Now, note that by the rules in the set D1,
xi ∈ E (¬xi ∈ E resp.) if si /∈ S ′ (si ∈ S ′ resp.). Let T X be the truth assignment to the set of variables X such that T X (xi) = true
(T X (xi) = false resp.) if si /∈ S ′ (si ∈ S ′ resp.). By the rules in the set D2, each E can be associated with a truth assignment T E
to the set of variables Y . In particular, T E is such that T E (y j) = true (T E (y j) = false resp.) if y j ∈ E (y j /∈ E resp.). Since,
for each extension E of (D(F ),W (F )S ′ ), it holds that φ ∈ E , by the rules in the set D3 it follows that ¬ f (X, Y , Z) /∈ E , and
hence it follows that for each truth assignment T E to the set of variables Y there exists a truth assignment T ZE to the set
of variables Z such that T X ∪ T E ∪ T ZE satisﬁes the formula f (X, Y , Z). To conclude, it is the case that S ′ encodes a truth
assignment T X for the variables in the set X such that T X implies ∀Y∃Z f (X, Y , Z), and hence it follows that the formula 
is valid. It can be therefore eventually concluded that F = ∧ is a valid formula.
2. (Membership) This part is analogous to the membership part of Point 1 of this theorem.
(Hardness) Let  = ∃X∀Y f (X, Y ) and  = ∀Z∃Wg(Z ,W ) be two quantiﬁed Boolean formulas, where X = x1, . . . , xn , Y =
y1, . . . , ym , Z = z1, . . . , zl , W = w1, . . . ,wp are disjoint sets of variables; f (X, Y ) = d1 ∨ · · · ∨ dr is a formula in disjunctive
normal form, where each disjunct d j (1  j  r) is the conjunction of three literals, that is, d j = t j,1 ∧ t j,2 ∧ t j,3; and
g(Z ,W ) = c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cs is a formula in conjunctive normal form, where each conjunct ch (1  h  s) is the disjunction of
three literals, that is, ch = uh,1 ∨ uh,2 ∨ uh,3.
Let F be the formula  ∧  . We associate with F the default theory (F ) = (D(F ),W (F )), which is identical to the
theory described in Point 1 of this theorem, except for the sets of rules D3 and D7 that are as follows:
D3 =
{
li ∧ x′1 ∧ · · · ∧ x′n ∧¬t j,k : ¬dk
¬dk | i = 1,2; j = 1, . . . , r; k = 1,2,3
}
∪
{¬d1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬dp : ¬φ
¬φ
}
,
D7 =
{
l1 ∧ l2 ∧ w ′1 ∧ · · · ∧ w ′p ∧¬uh,1 ∧¬uh,2 ∧¬uh,3 : ψ
ψ
| h = 1, . . . , s
}
.
The rest of the proof is analogous to that of Point 1 of this theorem. 
F. Angiulli et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 172 (2008) 1837–1872 1867Proof of Theorem 4.8. Outlier-min(S)(L) on general propositional default theories is
1. 
P3-complete, for general theories, and
2. 
P2-complete, for DF theories.
Proof. 1. (Membership) In order to answer query Outlier-min(S)(L), it must be veriﬁed that (problem q′) S and L satisfy
Deﬁnition 3.2, i.e., (D,WS ) | ¬S and (D,WS,L) 
| ¬S , and that (problem q′′) for each proper subset L′ of L, and S ′ of WL′ ,
S ′ and L′ do not satisfy Deﬁnition 3.2, i.e., (D,WS ′ ) 
| ¬S ′ or (D,WS ′,L′ ) | ¬S ′ .
Problem q′ coincides with Outlier(S)(L), and hence it is in DP2 (DP resp.) for general (DF resp.) theories. Furthermore,
problem q′′ is in 
P3 (
P2 resp.) for general (DF resp.) theories, since its negation can be answered by a nondeterministic
polynomial time Turing machine that guesses a pair of disjoint subsets L′ ⊆ L and S ′ ⊆ WL′ and then checks that they form
an outlier and witness pair by using an oracle in 	P2 . Thus, the overall problem is in 

P
3 (

P
2 resp.).
(Hardness) Let  = ∀W ∃U∀V g(W ,U , V ) be a quantiﬁed Boolean formula, where W = w1, . . . ,wp , U = u1, . . . ,up , and
V are disjoint set of variables. With  , the default theory () = (D(),W ()) is associated, where W () is the set
of literals {l1, l2, s,ψ,w1, . . . ,wp} where l1, l2, s and ψ are new letters distinct from those occurring in  , and D() is
composed of the default rules in the sets D5, D6, D7, and D8 reported in the reduction shown in Point 1 of Theorem 4.7,
plus the set of rules D0 = { l1:¬s¬s , l2:¬s¬s , l1∧l2:¬s¬s }.
Next, it is shown that  is valid iff L = {l1, l2} is a minimal outlier set with outlier witness set S = {s} in ().
It follows from Point 1 of Theorem 4.7, that {l1} and {l2} are outlier sets in (D()− D0,W ()), with associated witness
set SW ⊆ {ψ,w1, . . . ,wp}, if and only if  is not valid. Thus, in order for L to be a minimal outlier set, it must be the case
that  is valid. Finally, by rules in the set D0, it holds that
– (D(),W (){s}) | ¬s,
– (D(),W (){l1},{s}) | ¬s,
– (D(),W (){l2},{s}) | ¬s, and
– (D(),W (){l1,l2},{s}) 
| ¬s.
Hence, the result follows.
2. Both membership and hardness are analogous to Point 1 of this theorem. 
Appendix B. Proofs for Section 4.3
Proof of Theorem 4.11. For general EDPLs,
1. Outlier is 	P3-complete,
2. Outlier[k] is 	P3-complete,
3. Outlier(L) is 	P3-complete,
4. Outlier(S) is DP2-complete,
5. Outlier[k](S) is DP2-complete,
6. Outlier(S)(L) is DP2-complete,
7. Outlier-min(L) is DP3-complete, and
8. Outlier-min(S)(L) is 
P3-complete.
Proof. 1. (Membership) Given a rule-observations program P = (D,W ), we must show that there exist two disjoint sets S ⊆
W and L ⊆ W such that P S | ¬S (problem q′) and P S,L 
| ¬S (problem q′′). Problem q′ is 
P2-complete, while problem q′′
is 	P2-complete [21]. Thus, we can build a polynomial-time nondeterministic Turing machine equipped with a 	
P
2 oracle
that solves query Outlier as follows: the machine will ﬁrst guess the sets S and L and then solve queries q′ and q′′ by
calling the oracle twice.
(Hardness) Let  = ∃X∀Y∃Z f (X, Y , Z) be a quantiﬁed Boolean formula, where X = x1, . . . , xn , Y = y1, . . . , ym and Z =
z1, . . . , zl are disjoint set of variables, and f (X, Y , Z) is a Boolean formula in conjunctive normal form, i.e., f (X, Y , Z) =
C1 ∧ · · · ∧ CN , with Ch = th,1 ∨ th,2 ∨ th,3, and each th,1, th,2, th,3 is a literal in the set X ∪ Y ∪ Z , for h = 1, . . . ,N . We
associate with  the rule-observations program P () = 〈D(),W ()〉, where W () = {o, x0, x1, . . . , xn} consists of the
letters in the set X plus the new letters x0 and o which are distinct from those occurring in , and D() is
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r1,i : ¬xi | xi ← ¬φ (0 i  n)
r2,i : ¬xi ← not xi,not ¬φ (0 i  n)
r3,i : x′i ← not xi (1 i  n)
r4, j : y j | y′j ← (1 j m)
r5,k : zk | z′k ← (1 k l)
r6,k : zk ← ¬φ (1 k l)
r7,k : z′k ← ¬φ (1 k l)
r8,h : ¬φ ← σ(¬th,1),σ (¬th,2),σ (¬th,3) (1 h N)
where also X ′ = x′1, . . . , x′n , Y ′ = y′1, . . . , y′m , and Z ′ = z′1, . . . , z′l are new letters distinct from those occurring in , and
σ : X ∪¬X ∪ Y ∪¬Y ∪ Z ∪¬Z → X ∪ X ′ ∪ Y ∪ Y ′ ∪ Z ∪ Z ′ is the following mapping:
σ(t) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x′i if t = ¬xi (1 i  n),
y′j if t = ¬y j (1 j m),
z′k if t = ¬zk (1 k l),
t otherwise.
Clearly, P () can be built in polynomial time. Now we show that  is valid iff there exists an outlier in P ().
Given a truth assignment T on a subset of X ∪ Y ∪ Z , let I(T ) denote the context σ(Lit(T )).
(⇒) Suppose that  is valid. We shall show that L = {o} is an outlier in P (). Then there exists a truth assignment T X to
the variables in the set X such that T X satisﬁes ∀Y∃Z f (X, Y , Z). Let S = {x0}∪¬(Lit(T X )−), We will show that P ()S | ¬S .
By contradiction, suppose that there exists an answer set M ′ of P ()S such that ¬S 
⊂ M ′ . By rules r2,i , it is the case
that ¬φ ∈ M ′ . Furthermore, by rules r1,i , M ′ is of the form I(T X )∪ I(TY )∪ Z ∪ Z ′ ∪ {¬φ,o} ∪ S ′ , where TY denotes a truth
assignment to the set of variables in Y and S ′ is a set of the form {s | x ∈ S ∧ (s = x ∨ s = ¬x)} such that S ′ 
= ¬S . As a
consequence, the set M = I(T X )∪I(TY )∪ Z ∪ Z ′ ∪ {¬φ,o}∪¬S , where TY denotes a truth assignment to the set of variables
in Y , is an answer set of P ()S .
As M is an answer set of P ()S , and hence a minimal context closed under Red(P ()S ,M), it follows that for each truth
assignment T Z to the variables in the set Z , the subset M ′′ = I(T X )∪I(TY )∪I(T Z )∪ {o} ∪¬S of M is not a context closed
under Red(P ()S ,M). Thus, for each T Z there exists an h ∈ {1, . . . ,N} such that σ(¬th,1),σ (¬th,2),σ (¬th,3) ∈ M ′′ . We can
conclude that there exists an answer set M ′ of P ()S such that ¬S 
⊂ M ′ if and only if T X satisﬁes
∃Y∀Z
N∨
r=1
(¬tr,1 ∧¬tr,2 ∧¬tr,3) ≡ ¬∀Y∃Z f (X, Y , Z)
which contradicts the fact that T X satisﬁes ∀Y∃Z f (X, Y , Z). Hence, P ()S | ¬S . Let L = {o}; then, by rules r9 and r1,i ,
P ()S,L 
| ¬S . Thus, L = {o} is an outlier set with outlier witness set S .
(⇐) Suppose that there exists an outlier L ⊆ W () with witness S ⊆ W () in P . As ¬o cannot be entailed by P ()S ,
it must be the case that S ⊆ X ∪ {x0}. From what is stated above, P ()S | ¬S implies that the truth value assignment T X
on the set of variables X such that T X (xi) = false if and only if xi ∈ S , satisﬁes ∀Y∃Z f (X, Y , Z), i.e., that  is valid. To
conclude, the literal L = {o} is always an outlier having such a witness.
2. The proof is analogous to that of Point 1.
3. The proof is analogous to that of Point 1.
4. (Membership) Given the rule-observations program P = (D,W ), and a subset S ⊆ W , we should verify that there
exists L ⊆ WS such that P S | ¬S (problem q′) and P S,L 
| ¬S (problem q′′). We have already noted that problem q′ is

P2-complete. As for problem q
′′ , it is 	P2-complete as it can be answered by a polynomial-time nondeterministic Turing
machine with an NP oracle as follows: the machine guesses both an outlier L ⊆ WS and a consistent context M of P S,L
such that ¬S 
⊆ M , veriﬁes that M is closed under Red(P S,L,M), and decides whether M ′ ⊂ M exists such that M ′ is closed
under Red(P S,L,M) with a call to the NP oracle. Hence, we have to decide the conjunction q′ ∧ q′′ , i.e., a DP2 problem.
(Hardness) Let r be an EDLP rule, and let h(r) and b(r) denote respectively the head and the body of r. Let P ′ and P ′′
be two EDLPs. W.l.o.g. assume that P ′ and P ′′ contain no common letters and also that they do not contain the letters s
and l. Consider the rule-observations program P = (D,W ) where D = {h(r) ← b(r), l : r ∈ P ′} ∪ {h(r) ← b(r),not l : r ∈ P ′′}
and W = {s, l}. By noting that ANSW(P ′) = ANSW(P {s}) and ANSW(P ′′) = ANSW(P {s},{l}), it follows that P ′ is inconsistent
(a 
P2-complete check, see [21], Theorem 39) and P
′′ is consistent (a 	P2-complete check, see [21], Theorem 40) iff {l} is an
outlier with witness {s} in P .
5. The proof is analogous to that of Point 4.
6. The proof is analogous to that of Point 4.
7. (Membership) Analogous to the membership part of Theorem 4.7.
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 = ∃X∀Y∃Z f (X, Y , Z) be a quantiﬁed Boolean formula, where X = x1, . . . , xn , Y = y1, . . . , ym , and Z =
z1, are disjoint sets of variables, f (X, Y , Z) is the Boolean formula in conjunctive normal form C1 ∧ · · · ∧ CN , with Ch =
th,1 ∨ th,2 ∨ th,3, and each th,1, th,2, th,3 is a literal in the set X ∪ Y ∪ Z , for h = 1, . . . ,N .
Let  = ∀W ∃U∀V g(W ,U , V ) be another quantiﬁed Boolean formula, where W = w1, . . . ,wp , U = u1, . . . ,uq , and V =
v1, . . . , vr are disjoint sets of variables, and g(W ,U , V ) is the Boolean formula in disjunctive normal form D1 ∨ · · · ∨ DM ,
with Dh = sh,1 ∧ sh,2 ∧ sh,3, and each sh,1, sh,2, sh,3 is a literal in the set W ∪ U ∪ V , for h = 1, . . . ,M .
Let F be the formula ∧ . We associate with F the rule-observations program P (F ) = 〈D(F ),W (F )〉, where
W (F ) = {o1,o2, x0, x1, . . . , xn,w0,w1, . . . ,wp}
consists of the letters in the set X ∪ W plus the new letters x0, w0, o1 and o2 that are distinct from those occurring in F ,
and D(F ) is
r′′0,1 : ¬ψ ← not o1
r′0 : ¬φ ← not o1,not o2 r′′0,2 : ¬ψ ← not o2
r′1,i : ¬xi | xi ← ¬φ (0 i  n) r′′1,i : ¬wi | wi ← ¬ψ (0 i  p)
r′2,i : ¬xi ← not xi,not ¬φ (0 i  n) r′′2,i : ¬wi ← not wi,not ¬ψ (0 i  p)
r′3,i : x′i ← not xi (1 i  n) r′′3,i : w ′i ← not wi (1 i  p)
r′4, j : y j | y′j ← (1 j m) r′′4, j : u j | u′j ← (1 j  q)
r′5,k : zk | z′k ← (1 k l) r′′5,k : vk | v ′k ← (1 k r)
r′6,k : zk ← ¬φ (1 k l) r′′6,k : vk ← ¬ψ (1 k r)
r′7,k : z′k ← ¬φ (1 k l) r′′7,k : v ′k ← ¬ψ (1 k r)
r′8,h : ¬φ ← σ(¬th,1),σ (¬th,2),σ (¬th,3) (1 h N) r′8,0 : ¬ψ ← ¬d1, . . . ,¬dM
r′′8,1,h : ¬dh ← σ(¬sh,1) (1 h M)
r′′8,2,h : ¬dh ← σ(¬sh,2) (1 h M)
r′′8,3,h : ¬dh ← σ(¬sh,3) (1 h M)
where also X ′ = x′1, . . . , x′n , Y ′ = y′1, . . . , y′m , Z ′ = z′1, . . . , z′l , W ′ = w ′1, . . . ,w ′p , U ′ = u′1, . . . ,u′q , and V ′ = v ′1, . . . , v ′r are new
letters distinct from those occurring in F , and σ : X ∪ ¬X ∪ Y ∪ ¬Y ∪ Z ∪ ¬Z ∪ W ∪ ¬W ∪ U ∪ ¬U ∪ V ∪ ¬V → X ∪ X ′ ∪
Y ∪ Y ′ ∪ Z ∪ Z ′ ∪ W ∪ W ′ ∪ U ∪ U ′ ∪ V ∪ V ′ is the following mapping:
σ(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x′i, if t = ¬xi (1 i  n),
y′j, if t = ¬y j (1 j m),
z′k, if t = ¬zk (1 k l),
w ′i, if t = ¬wi (1 i  n),
u′j, if t = ¬u j (1 j m),
v ′k, if t = ¬vk (1 k l),
t, otherwise.
Clearly, P (F ) can be built in polynomial time. Now we show that F is valid iff {o1,o2} is a minimal outlier set in P (F ).
The line of reasoning employed to prove the result is analogous to that of the hardness part of Theorem 4.7, Point 1.
The reader is referred to the discussion preceding the reduction therein for the explanation of that line of reasoning. Next,
technicalities concerning the reduction presented here are pointed out.
First of all, in order to understand the role of rules r′ (r′′ , resp.) in the reduction depicted above, we note that these rules
have the same structure as the rules used in the reduction given in Point 1 of this proof, where a 	P3-complete problem is
considered.
In particular, rules r′ serve the purpose of guaranteeing that (D(F ),W (F )S ) | ¬(S ∩ S X ) if and only if the formula
 = ∃X∀Y∃Z f (X, Y , Z) is satisﬁable (see Point (c) of the discussion recalled above), while rules r′′ serve the purpose of
guaranteeing that (D(F ),W (F )S ) | ¬(S ∩ SW ) if and only if the formula  = ∃W∀U∃V¬g(W ,U , V ) is satisﬁable (see
Point (d) of the same discussion).
As for the relationship between the minimality of the outlier set {o1,o2} and the satisﬁability of the formula ∧ , this
is taken care of by rules r′0, r′′0,1 and r′′0,2 (once again, refer to the discussion of Theorem 4.7, Point 1, and to Point 1 of this
proof for details).
8. Both membership and hardness are analogous to that of Theorem 4.8. For the hardness part, we can make use of rules
r′′ deﬁned in Point 7 of this proof, plus rules equivalent to the defaults in the set D0 deﬁned in Point 1 of Theorem 4.8. 
Appendix C. Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Theorem 5.3. The data complexity of Outlier is 	P-complete.3
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(Hardness) To prove the completeness of the query Outlier, the 	P3-complete problem of deciding the validity of a
QBE3,∃ formula is reduced to it. A QBE3,∃ formula  has the form ∃X∀Y∃Z f (X, Y , Z), where X = x1, . . . , xn , Y = y1, . . . , ym ,
and Z are disjoint sets of variables, and f (X, Y , Z) is a propositional formula on X, Y , Z . Without loss of generality, it can
be assumed that the Boolean formula f (X, Y , Z) is in conjunctive normal form with exactly three literals per clause, that
is, that f (X, Y , Z) = c1 ∧ c2 ∧ · · · ∧ cr , with ck = tk,1 ∨ tk,2 ∨ tk,3, for k = 1, . . . , r.
We now describe a ﬁxed default theory FO = (DFO,W FO), where W FO does not contain atomic formulas, and a
mapping W () from any QBE3,∃ formula  to a set of ground literals, such that there exists an outlier in FO() =
(DFO,W FO ∪ W ()) if and only if the formula  is satisﬁable. We encode the formula  in the extensional component
W () of FO() by means of the following sets of atoms:
WX =
{
e(xi, xi+1) | i = 1, . . . ,n− 1
}∪ {e(xn, x0)},
WY =
{
u(y j, y j+1) | j = 1, . . . ,m− 1
}∪ {u(ym, y0)}, and
W f =
{
c
(
ck, ck+1, sgn(tk,1), let(tk,1), sgn(tk,2), let(tk,2), sgn(tk,3), let(tk,3)
) | k = 1, . . . , r − 1}
∪ {c(cr, c0, sgn(tr,1), let(tr,1), sgn(tr,2), let(tr,2), sgn(tr,3), let(tr,3))},
where sgn() is the constant p if  is a positive literal, and the constant n if  is a negative literal, while let() is the
propositional letter occurring in the literal . Intuitively, atoms with functor e list existential variables in the set X , atoms
with functor u list universal variables in the set Y , and atoms with functor c list clauses of the formula f (X, Y , Z). Variables
in the set Z are not explicitly listed, since this is not needed for the sake of the reduction. In the following the set WX ∪
WY ∪ W f is denoted by W .
It must be avoided that atoms in the set W become part of an outlier or a witness, for otherwise the above encoding
of the formula  is invalidated. With this aim, the following rules, forming the set W FO, are employed:
r0 : f ∨¬ f → t,
r1 : t → t(x0),
r2 : t → e(x0, x1),
r3 : t → u(y0, y1),
r4 : t → c(c0, c1, p, x0, p, x0, p, x0),
r5 : (∀A)(∀B)(∃C)
(
e(A, B) → e(B,C)),
r6 : (∀A)(∀B)(∃C)
(
u(A, B) → u(B,C)),
r7 : (∀A)(∀B)(∃C)(∃V1) . . . (∃V12)
(
c(A, B, V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, V6) → c(B,C, V7, V8, V9, V10, V12, V12)
)
.
Rules r2, r3, and r4 introduce one additional existential variable, a universal variable, and a clause, respectively, whose roles
are clariﬁed below. Rules r5, r6, and r7 serve the purpose of making the overall theory inconsistent whenever at least one
atom in the set W is removed from W (). Indeed, assume that an atom of the form e(xi, xi+1) is removed from W ().
Then the formula e(xi−1, xi) → e(xi, xi+1), and consequently also the formula r5, evaluates to false. In particular, formula r5
is true if and only if the atomic formulas of the form e(xi, x(i+1)mod(n+1)) are either all true or all false. Hence, it follows
from formula r2 that if at least one of the atoms in the set WX is removed, then the theory is inconsistent. The same
reasoning can be applied for all the other atoms in the set W . Assume that L is an outlier with witness S in FO() such
that (L ∪ S) ∩ W 
= ∅. Then, the default theory (DFO,W FO ∪ W ()S,L) is inconsistent and (DFO,W FO ∪ W ()S,L) | ¬S , a
contradiction. Thus, outliers and witnesses cannot contain atoms belonging to the set W .
Given a propositional variable v , we use the literals t(v) and ¬t(v) to represent the information that v is true and that
v is false, respectively, in a certain truth value assignment. The truth value of a 3CNF formula whose clauses are encoded
by means of the atoms above can be thus evaluated by using the following ﬁrst-order formula:
F = (∀A)(∀B)(∀T1)(∀T2)(∀T3)
((
c(A, B, p, T1, p, T2, p, T3) → t(T1)∨ t(T2)∨ t(T3)
)
∧ (c(A, B,n, T1, p, T2, p, T3) → ¬t(T1)∨ t(T2)∨ t(T3))
∧ (c(A, B, p, T1,n, T2, p, T3) → t(T1)∨¬t(T2)∨ t(T3))
∧ (c(A, B,n, T1,n, T2, p, T3) → ¬t(T1)∨¬t(T2)∨ t(T3))
∧ (c(A, B, p, T1, p, T2,n, T3) → t(T1)∨ t(T2)∨¬t(T3))
∧ (c(A, B,n, T1, p, T2,n, T3) → ¬t(T1)∨ t(T2)∨¬t(T3))
∧ (c(A, B, p, T1,n, T2,n, T3) → t(T1)∨¬t(T2)∨¬t(T3))
∧ (c(A, B,n, T1,n, T2,n, T3) → ¬t(T1)∨¬t(T2)∨¬t(T3))).
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truth value assignment.
Now, we are in a position to complete the reduction FO(). The set W () is given by
W ∪
{
l,¬φ, t(x1), . . . , t(xn)
}
,
while DFO is the ﬁxed set of defaults D1 ∪ D2 ∪ D3 ∪ D4, where:
D1 =
{
e(A,C)∧ t(A) : ok(A)
ok(A)
,
e(A,C) : ¬t(A)
¬t(A) ,
e(A,C)∧¬φ : t(A)
t(A)
,
e(A,C)∧¬t(A) : ok(A)
ok(A)
}
,
D2 =
{ : φ
φ
,
: ¬l
¬l ,
¬l : ¬φ
¬φ
}
,
D3 =
{
u(B,C) : t(B)
t(B)
,
u(B,C) : ¬t(B)
¬t(B)
}
,
D4 =
{
((∀A)(e(A,C) → ok(A)))∧¬F : ¬φ
¬φ
}
.
The reader can verify that the grounded version PROP(FO()), which is a ﬁnite propositional general default theory, is
equivalent to the default theory () described in the hardness part of Theorem 4.1, Point 1. Hence, from what is stated
above, and from Theorem 4.1, the result follows. 
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